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Review of anti-corruption strategies Rob McCusker - Australian ...

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Conclusion<br />

It has been argued that most <strong>anti</strong>-<strong>corruption</strong> programs rely on legal and financial institutions such as the<br />

judiciary, police and financial auditors to enforce and strengthen accountability in the public sector. The<br />

assumption here is that more and better enforcement <strong>of</strong> rules and regulations will reduce <strong>corruption</strong>. The<br />

problem with such an approach is that in many poor countries the legal and financial institutions are weak<br />

and <strong>of</strong>ten corrupt themselves (Svensson 2005).<br />

A more fundamental cause for the relative failure <strong>of</strong> <strong>anti</strong>-<strong>corruption</strong> <strong>strategies</strong> is that they are ‘more<br />

<strong>of</strong>ten limited to rhetoric, and are only rarely sustained’ (Wei 2001: 6). Wei suggests that this is because<br />

some political leaders fear the political risks associated with radical and entrenched reform <strong>of</strong> corrupt<br />

processes/practices and that the cost <strong>of</strong> creating significant reforms and achieving essential progress is<br />

<strong>of</strong>ten prohibitive.<br />

There remain a number <strong>of</strong> difficulties with tackling <strong>corruption</strong>. First, <strong>anti</strong>-<strong>corruption</strong> efforts that seek to<br />

establish and appeal to a moral or ethical high ground via education <strong>of</strong> the corruptors and corruptees<br />

are, some argue, unlikely to succeed. The very mechanisms <strong>of</strong> government create overriding incentives<br />

for corrupt rather than <strong>anti</strong>-corrupt activities. Second, this also reduces the deterrence component <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>anti</strong>-<strong>corruption</strong> penalties within the criminal law or code <strong>of</strong> the country concerned. The corrupt individual<br />

arguably considers the prospect <strong>of</strong> being caught rather than the punishment they might incur in the<br />

unlikely event <strong>of</strong> interception. Third, it is not unusual to discover <strong>corruption</strong> and incompetence within<br />

government occupying the same space and this may be exacerbated by systems <strong>of</strong> allocating influential<br />

government positions on the basis <strong>of</strong> patronage rather than ability. A corrupt appointment process simply<br />

facilitates further <strong>corruption</strong> by the post-holders (Cobb & Gonzalez 2005).<br />

Others have expressed doubt about the argument that <strong>corruption</strong> can be fought through a series <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>anti</strong>-<strong>corruption</strong> agencies, the creation <strong>of</strong> all-encompassing laws and the establishment <strong>of</strong> codes <strong>of</strong> ethical<br />

conduct. In many cases it is suggested that these are constituents <strong>of</strong> a perception <strong>of</strong> successful <strong>anti</strong><strong>corruption</strong><br />

efforts which disguise the lack <strong>of</strong> real progress on the ground (Kaufmann 2005).<br />

It is suggested that a broad based approach must be adopted in relation to <strong>anti</strong>-<strong>corruption</strong> <strong>strategies</strong><br />

if systematic <strong>corruption</strong> is to be mitigated. Successful campaigns against <strong>corruption</strong> have included<br />

measures to reduce the opportunities for and benefits <strong>of</strong> <strong>corruption</strong>, to increase the likelihood that it will<br />

be detected and to make it far more likely that a transgressor will be punished. Conversely, difficulties<br />

with <strong>anti</strong>-<strong>corruption</strong> <strong>strategies</strong> have included limits being placed upon power or commitment at senior,<br />

and therefore influential, political and social levels, overly ambitious <strong>anti</strong>-<strong>corruption</strong> promises leading to<br />

unrealistic and unachievable expectations and subsequent loss <strong>of</strong> public confidence, piecemeal and<br />

uncoordinated reforms, failure to establish institutional mechanisms that outlive the reformers, failure<br />

<strong>of</strong> the government to include and utilise private sector opinion leaders and failure to devise effective<br />

communications programs (Kindra & Stapenhurst 1998).<br />

There are no simple solutions to the problem <strong>of</strong> <strong>corruption</strong> but it is important to recognise the<br />

fundamental role that political will and support for reforms at the highest levels <strong>of</strong> government can play<br />

in bringing about practical results and in raising the credibility <strong>of</strong>, and public support for, <strong>anti</strong>-<strong>corruption</strong><br />

progress. It has been argued that numerous studies ‘…show that a common sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>corruption</strong> is an<br />

absence <strong>of</strong> strong government institutions, such as the judiciary, the legislature, the <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> the auditorgeneral,<br />

the police, the <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> the ombudsman and watchdog agencies. The important role that the<br />

media, civil society organisations, and the private sector…can play in the fight against <strong>corruption</strong> is also<br />

vitally important, and should not be underestimated’ (Aziz 2003).

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