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Ties That Bind - Bay Area Council Economic Institute

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122<br />

<strong>Ties</strong> <strong>That</strong> <strong>Bind</strong><br />

U.S. for at least another decade. In niche areas such as cell phone cards, however, Chinese capabilities<br />

may rise more rapidly.<br />

In 2004 the U.S. and China settled a World Trade Organization complaint, initiated by U.S.based<br />

IDMs, which challenged China’s policy of rebating a 17% value-added tax on semiconductors<br />

produced and sold domestically. The Taiwan government—concerned about the potential<br />

economic dependence created by the $100 billion in Taiwanese investment already in<br />

China—has placed restrictions on new semiconductor investment and technology transfer on<br />

the mainland.<br />

Although semiconductor equipment manufacturing is identified as a goal in China’s five year<br />

plan, because of its high capital costs, its intellectual capital intensity, and the speed with which<br />

the technology advances, China isn’t likely to develop a major semiconductor equipment manufacturing<br />

capability in the near future. This means China will remain an attractive market for <strong>Bay</strong><br />

<strong>Area</strong> equipment producers. U.S. producers will need to compete on price, however, with the<br />

used equipment being imported for lower-tech fabs.<br />

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San Jose’s Intel Corporation, which has fabs in the United States (6), Israel and Ireland, and<br />

assembly and/or testing facilities in Costa Rica, Malaysia and the Philippines, operates three<br />

plants in Shanghai, and recently invested $200 million in a fourth in Chengdu, a city of 10 million<br />

in Sichuan Province, deep in China’s interior. Despite its remoteness from Beijing and from the<br />

major coastal centers where most foreign companies locate, Chengdu offered labor costs 30%<br />

lower than Shanghai and generous local incentives. To support its venture into virgin territory,<br />

Intel trained most of its workforce from the outset. Production workers were sent to train at Intel<br />

facilities in Malaysia and the Philippines, and courses on semiconductor physics and in factory<br />

processes were created at local schools and universities. Since then its first plant in Chengdu has<br />

ramped up more quickly than expected, and construction is underway on a second facility. With<br />

the opening of its second Chengdu plant, Intel will have 6,000 employees in China.<br />

Intel rival AMD does its product and systems R&D for microprocessors in the U.S., with additional<br />

design and development teams located in Germany, China, Japan, India and Korea. Manufacturing<br />

of its microprocessors takes place at five facilities: two wafer fabs in Dresden, Germany<br />

and three assembly and test facilities in Singapore, Penang (Malaysia), and Suzhou (China). AMD<br />

also operates eight flash memory manufacturing facilities, including wafer fabs in Austin and<br />

Aizu-Wakamatsu (Japan), and assembly and testing facilities in Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Penang<br />

and Suzhou. Several AMD sales and marketing offices in China target its growing market, particularly<br />

for flash memory products used in mobile phones.<br />

A number of Silicon Valley firms have found lucrative markets as suppliers to the foundries.<br />

Mountain View-based chip design software maker Synopsys, for example, has been active in<br />

Taiwan since 1991 and currently has two offices there—in Taipei and Hsinchu—as well as offices<br />

in Hong Kong, Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen. Synopsys software helps designers of

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