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Nye forskningsrapporterRapportene kan fåes ved henvendelse til:NORGES HANDELSHØYSKOLEHelleveien 30, 5035 Bergen-Sandviken, tlf (05) 95 92 77, telefax (05) 95 95 43Redaktør:Rolf J. BrunstadRedaksjon:Torstein ByeFredrik CarlsenArild HervikSteinar HoldenKjell Erik LommerudBirger VikorenUtgitt avSosialøkonomenes ForeningLeder: Erik Lind IversenGeneralsekr.: Gerd Buflod•Bladets adresse:Storgi. 26 IV0184 OSLOTelefon (02) 17 00 35Telefax (02) 17 31 55Postgiro: 0813 5167887Bankgiro: 6001.05. I 3408•Utkommer med 11 nummerpr. Ar, den 15. i hver månedunntatt juli.Abonnement kr 420,—Studentabonnement kr 210,—Enkeltnr. kr 60,— inkl. porto.ANNONSEPRISER(ekskl in v a):1/1 side kr. 3 200,—3/4 side kr. 2 500.-1/2 side kr. 2 000,—Byråprovisjon 10 7Frist for annonser:Den 5. i hver måned.Forskningsrapporter:Pr. innrykk kr. 200,—[maks. 400 anslag)Trykt i offset.Grafisk Hus a/s, BergenInvestment Incentives and Differences in National Tax SystemsAv Guttorm SchjelderupA consumer is the sole owner of a multinational firm. The firm undertakes investmentsin two countries. It is shown that the imposition of taxes affects investmentsbetween the two countries by increasing or decreasing the rental rate of capital relativeto the pre tax situation and relative to each other. The analysis demonstrates, contraryto conventional wisdom, that taxation may in some cases change the cost ofcapital in favor of the country with the highest tax rates and the least generous taxdeductible expenditures. This result is established when personal, corporate and dividendtaxes interact with tax deductible depreciation allowances. Differences in thecomposition of investments when taxes are non-distortionary are also studied.Discussion paper 01/91, January 1991, ISSN 0801-1125, 21 sider.Optimal Taxation, Capital Mobility and Tax EvasionAv Guttorm SchjelderupThe purpose of this paper is twofold. The first part of the paper analyses the savingsdecisions of a consumer in a two period open economy model. Due to bank secrecylaws and tax havens, governments can only imperfectly tax foreign savings. Theextent of tax evasion is assumed to be a function of money allocation to tax enforcement.Thus the allocation of savings between countries is a decision under uncertainty.The second part of the paper studies how taxes should be set optimally on foreignand domestic savings and how much money if any should be allocated to tax enforcement.Discussion Paper 02/91, January 1991, ISSN 0801-1125, 29 sider.Renegotiation in an Insurance MarketAv Geir B. Asheim og Tore NiissenRenegotiation is the act of replacing an existing contract with new ones that arebeneficial for the contracting parties in light of new information. In the present work,we extend the theory of markets with asymmetric information to the case where aconsumer and a firm are allowed to renegotiate the terms of a contract once it is signed.In a simplified version of the Rothschild-Stiglitz model of an insurance market,we characterize equilibrium when renegotiation is allowed and compare it with equilibriumin the case without renegotiation. We find that, with renegotiation, the equilibriumis never fully separating, and it is pooling when the fraction of low-risk consumersis high. While high-risk consumers always benefit (weakly) from the introductionof renegotiation, low-risks are better off for some parameter values and worse offfor others. In particular, for a high fraction of low-risk consumer, both types of consumersare strictly better off compared to the case without renegotiation.Discussion Paper 03/91, January 1991, ISSN 0801-1125, 33 sider.32 SosialOkonomen nr. 10 1991