hu wissen (pdf) - Exzellenzinitiative - Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin

Wählerdruck wirkt sich in Regierungssystemen
mit starken Sozialpartnern nicht
sonderlich positiv auf Reformen aus
In government systems with strong social
partners, voter pressure doesn’t have a very
positive eff ect on reforms
tributions to provoke political blockades,« says Immergut. But the
result was surprising: in both federal and centrally governed
countries, the citizens are more reasonable and thoughtful in
their voting behaviour than politicians give them credit for. There
are big diff erences, however. »In government systems with strong
social partners (i.e. employers and trade unions), voter pressure
doesn’t have a very positive eff ect on reforms,« according to Immergut.
The introduction of the pension formula based on net rather
than gross wages, the Riester pension and the raising of the retirement
age to 67 in Germany, are all eff ective measures taken in
recent years to ease the pressure on the pension providers here in
the long term. But their introduction depended upon cooperation
with social partners such as business associations and trade
unions.
Immergut fi nds it »surprising« that up to now the idea of a
fl exible retirement age has not been fl oated as an alternative in
Germany. »We are always talking about an absolute number of
working years, but very diff erent social groups. An industrial
worker starts his heavy physical work immediately a� er fi nishing
his training. He bears the risk to his health. An academic, by contrast,
starts her professional life later, and o� en wants to work
longer,« explains Immergut. The pension expert therefore calls for
recognition of the »individual working years«, irrespective of the
year stipulated by law in which one is supposed to retire. Spain
and Italy have already introduced the fl exible retirement age, as a
step towards more sustainable pension policy. Austria and Scandinavia
have even introduced a bonus system. »People who work
longer receive higher pensions,« says Immergut.
The Swedish model is praised by the World Bank as being
particularly eff ective. Every working person in Sweden between
the ages of 16 and 64 is insured under the supplementary pension
system. Employers and employees each pay half of the contributions.
A total of 18.5 percent of total salaries are paid into the
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pension insurance scheme, and 16 percent of this goes to the payas-you-go
system. The remaining 2.5 percent is paid into a newly
established investment fund. Each employee can decide for him or
herself which of the 600 possible funds – ranging from low- to
high-risk – to invest in. Unlike the Riester reform in Germany, this
part of the fully funded old-age provision is compulsory for all.
»This reform is very valuable from an economic point of view;
it remains to be seen whether it really can counter age poverty,
however,« says Ellen Immergut. The pension systems have also
been reformed in Portugal, Italy and even Greece. »These are important
fi rst steps, yet it is doubtful whether it will be enough to
stabilize the systems in the long-term. Further research is needed
to determine the eff ects more precisely.«
This is why the political scientist’s next step will be to calculate
how much benefi t the individual reforms really will achieve. She is
collaborating in this with the colleagues from the C.A.S.E. – Centre
for Applied Statistics and Economics at the School of Business
and Economics. To save succeeding generations from rapidly rising
pension contributions and to limit the risks of poverty in old
age, the researchers are currently examining whether the Swedish
model can also be applied in a very similar manner in Germany.
If it helped relieve the pressure, this could then be used to reduce
non-wage labour costs. »We cannot make a fi nal decision on
which pension system is the best; the conditions in the countries
studied vary much too for that. Instead, our aim is to develop wellfounded
action options,« says Ellen Immergut.
Ellen Immergut (with Karen Anderson and Isabelle Schulze):
The Oxford Handbook of West European Pension Politics, Oxford;
Oxford University Press, 932 pages, paperback edition, 2009.
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