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JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES

JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES

JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES

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159<br />

For both the bank and its business units, risk limits were categorized as either Level 1 or<br />

Level 2 limits. Breaches of Level 1 limits were viewed as more serious. According to a March<br />

2012 JPMorgan Chase presentation on market risk limits, the “[CIO] Risk Committee reviews<br />

Level 1 and Level 2 limits for each business on a monthly basis.” 876 When Level 1 firm limits<br />

were breached, the firm Operating Committee was notified by email. Changes in or waivers of<br />

bankwide Level 1 limits required the approval of the CEO and CRO. Changes in or waivers of a<br />

business unit’s Level 1 limits also required the approval of the unit head and its CRO. 877 For<br />

example, the bankwide 10Q VaR limit was a Level 1 limit; its waiver or adjustment required Mr.<br />

Dimon's approval. 878 The CIO 10Q VaR limit was a Level 1 limit inside the CIO; its waiver or<br />

adjustment required the approval of Ina Drew. 879<br />

Documents obtained by the Subcommittee indicate that, in theory, breaches of Level 1<br />

and Level 2 risk limits—“excessions” in the bank’s parlance—required immediate remedial<br />

action. A March 2012 JPMorgan Chase presentation provided to the OCC, for example, outlines<br />

the actions that were supposedly mandatory when those risk limits were breached. It states that,<br />

for breaches of Level 1 and Level 2 limits: “Business unit must take immediate steps toward<br />

reducing the exposure to be within the limit, unless a One-off Approval is granted by all Grantors<br />

and Grantees of limits.” 880 JPMorgan Chase’s 2011 Annual Report states: “Limit breaches are<br />

reported in a timely manner to senior management and the affected line-of-business is required<br />

to reduce trading positions or consult with senior management on the appropriate action.” 881<br />

In practice, the bank told the Subcommittee that its risk metrics were intended to act, not<br />

as ironclad limits, but as guidelines and red flags. Mr. Dimon told the Subcommittee that a<br />

breach in a risk “limit” was intended to lead to a conversation about the situation, not to an<br />

876<br />

See, e.g., 3/2012 presentation prepared by JPMorgan Chase entitled “Market Risk Limits,” at 1, OCC-SPI-<br />

00117682.<br />

877<br />

Id. at 13.<br />

878<br />

Subcommittee interview of Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan Chase (9/19/2012).<br />

879<br />

See also 2013 JPMorgan Chase Task Force Report, at 75-76 (describing the CIO’s risk limit policy: “The three<br />

categories of risk metrics applicable to CIO were VaR, stress, and non-statistical credit-spread widening metrics<br />

(Credit Spread Basis Point Value (‘CSBPV’) and CSW 10%). Pursuant to Firm policy, each of these metrics was<br />

subject to certain limits. Limits are classified by type, as Level 1, Level 2, or ‘threshold.’ A limit’s type determines<br />

who is responsible for approving the limit, who receives notice of any excessions, and who within the Firm is<br />

responsible for approving any increases. The CIO Global 10-Q VaR and CIO stress limits were Level 1 limits, while<br />

the CIO CSBPV and CSW 10% limits were Level 2 limits. Any excessions of Level 1 or Level 2 limits had to be<br />

reported to the signitories to the limit, the risk Committee for the line of business, and the Market Risk Committee<br />

or Business Control Committee for the line of business. Under Firm policy, all excession notifications should<br />

include (1) a description of the limit excess, (2) the amount of the limit, (3) the exposure value (i.e. the amount by<br />

which the limit has been exceeded) and the percentage by which the limit has been exceeded, and (4) the number of<br />

consecutive days the limit has been exceeded.”).<br />

880<br />

See, e.g., 3/2012 presentation prepared by JPMorgan Chase entitled “Market Risk Limits,” at 13, OCC-SPI-<br />

00117682.<br />

881<br />

3/30/2012, “2011 Annual Report,” JPMorgan Chase publication, at 162,<br />

http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/1839748086x0x556139/75b4bd59-02e7-4495-a84c-<br />

06e0b19d6990/JPMC_2011_annual_report_complete.pdf. See also 2013 JPMorgan Chase Task Force Report, at 76<br />

(describing how the CIO was supposed to respond to risk limit breaches: “Excessions are addressed differently<br />

depending on type, but in the event of ‘active limit excess,’ which occurs when a business unit exceeds its own limit,<br />

the business unit ‘must take immediate steps to reduce its exposure so as to be within the limit,’ unless a ‘one-off<br />

approval’ is granted. A ‘one-off approval’ refers to a temporary increase for a limited period of time; it must be<br />

provided by the persons who were responsible for setting the original limit.”).

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