JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES
JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES
JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
159<br />
For both the bank and its business units, risk limits were categorized as either Level 1 or<br />
Level 2 limits. Breaches of Level 1 limits were viewed as more serious. According to a March<br />
2012 JPMorgan Chase presentation on market risk limits, the “[CIO] Risk Committee reviews<br />
Level 1 and Level 2 limits for each business on a monthly basis.” 876 When Level 1 firm limits<br />
were breached, the firm Operating Committee was notified by email. Changes in or waivers of<br />
bankwide Level 1 limits required the approval of the CEO and CRO. Changes in or waivers of a<br />
business unit’s Level 1 limits also required the approval of the unit head and its CRO. 877 For<br />
example, the bankwide 10Q VaR limit was a Level 1 limit; its waiver or adjustment required Mr.<br />
Dimon's approval. 878 The CIO 10Q VaR limit was a Level 1 limit inside the CIO; its waiver or<br />
adjustment required the approval of Ina Drew. 879<br />
Documents obtained by the Subcommittee indicate that, in theory, breaches of Level 1<br />
and Level 2 risk limits—“excessions” in the bank’s parlance—required immediate remedial<br />
action. A March 2012 JPMorgan Chase presentation provided to the OCC, for example, outlines<br />
the actions that were supposedly mandatory when those risk limits were breached. It states that,<br />
for breaches of Level 1 and Level 2 limits: “Business unit must take immediate steps toward<br />
reducing the exposure to be within the limit, unless a One-off Approval is granted by all Grantors<br />
and Grantees of limits.” 880 JPMorgan Chase’s 2011 Annual Report states: “Limit breaches are<br />
reported in a timely manner to senior management and the affected line-of-business is required<br />
to reduce trading positions or consult with senior management on the appropriate action.” 881<br />
In practice, the bank told the Subcommittee that its risk metrics were intended to act, not<br />
as ironclad limits, but as guidelines and red flags. Mr. Dimon told the Subcommittee that a<br />
breach in a risk “limit” was intended to lead to a conversation about the situation, not to an<br />
876<br />
See, e.g., 3/2012 presentation prepared by JPMorgan Chase entitled “Market Risk Limits,” at 1, OCC-SPI-<br />
00117682.<br />
877<br />
Id. at 13.<br />
878<br />
Subcommittee interview of Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan Chase (9/19/2012).<br />
879<br />
See also 2013 JPMorgan Chase Task Force Report, at 75-76 (describing the CIO’s risk limit policy: “The three<br />
categories of risk metrics applicable to CIO were VaR, stress, and non-statistical credit-spread widening metrics<br />
(Credit Spread Basis Point Value (‘CSBPV’) and CSW 10%). Pursuant to Firm policy, each of these metrics was<br />
subject to certain limits. Limits are classified by type, as Level 1, Level 2, or ‘threshold.’ A limit’s type determines<br />
who is responsible for approving the limit, who receives notice of any excessions, and who within the Firm is<br />
responsible for approving any increases. The CIO Global 10-Q VaR and CIO stress limits were Level 1 limits, while<br />
the CIO CSBPV and CSW 10% limits were Level 2 limits. Any excessions of Level 1 or Level 2 limits had to be<br />
reported to the signitories to the limit, the risk Committee for the line of business, and the Market Risk Committee<br />
or Business Control Committee for the line of business. Under Firm policy, all excession notifications should<br />
include (1) a description of the limit excess, (2) the amount of the limit, (3) the exposure value (i.e. the amount by<br />
which the limit has been exceeded) and the percentage by which the limit has been exceeded, and (4) the number of<br />
consecutive days the limit has been exceeded.”).<br />
880<br />
See, e.g., 3/2012 presentation prepared by JPMorgan Chase entitled “Market Risk Limits,” at 13, OCC-SPI-<br />
00117682.<br />
881<br />
3/30/2012, “2011 Annual Report,” JPMorgan Chase publication, at 162,<br />
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/1839748086x0x556139/75b4bd59-02e7-4495-a84c-<br />
06e0b19d6990/JPMC_2011_annual_report_complete.pdf. See also 2013 JPMorgan Chase Task Force Report, at 76<br />
(describing how the CIO was supposed to respond to risk limit breaches: “Excessions are addressed differently<br />
depending on type, but in the event of ‘active limit excess,’ which occurs when a business unit exceeds its own limit,<br />
the business unit ‘must take immediate steps to reduce its exposure so as to be within the limit,’ unless a ‘one-off<br />
approval’ is granted. A ‘one-off approval’ refers to a temporary increase for a limited period of time; it must be<br />
provided by the persons who were responsible for setting the original limit.”).