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JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES

JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES

JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES

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52<br />

Notionals more than tripled in the first quarter, then tripled again in the second quarter to reach<br />

$42 billion. 317<br />

Towards the end of 2011, JPMorgan Chase became concerned about the level of the<br />

318<br />

CIO’s Risk Weighted Assets (RWA) and ordered a reduction in its RWA. RWA is a dollar<br />

measure of a bank’s assets, adjusted according to the assets’ risk. 319 It is used to calculate the<br />

bank’s minimum capital requirements, with a greater ratio of equity-based capital required for<br />

banks with higher RWA. 320 Mr. Iksil strategized that the SCP could go long on credit risk, use<br />

the longs to offset the portfolio’s shorts, and thereby reduce the CIO’s overall RWA. 321 He<br />

wrote: “We can reduce [RWA] by simply selling protection but then the pnl [profit and loss]<br />

volatility will increase potentially.” 322<br />

His supervisor, Mr. Martin-Artajo, responded that the CIO should not go outright long on<br />

323<br />

its credit assets because it would breach the CIO’s stress loss limit. Instead, Mr. Martin-<br />

Artajo instructed Mr. Iksil to do “forward trades.” 324 The type of forward trade he was<br />

suggesting occurs when a trader buys a long credit position with a long-term maturity date, and a<br />

short credit position with a short-term maturity date, in order to be hedged in the shorter term but<br />

gain exposure to credit risk in the longer term. 325<br />

The CIO traders adopted that trading strategy.<br />

Whether that trading strategy helped reduce the CIO’s RWA in 2011 is unclear. The<br />

records that have been produced to the Subcommittee tracing the SCP’s RWA in 2011 and 2012<br />

are incomplete and contradictory. For example, one January 2012 OCC document reported that<br />

326<br />

the SCP’s RWA at the end of 2011 was $70 billion, while other materials reported that, by the<br />

beginning of 2012, the CIO’s RWA was around $40 billion. 327<br />

When asked by the<br />

317<br />

See “Summary of Positions by Type,” prepared by JPMorgan Chase in response to a Subcommittee request,<br />

JPM-CIO-PSI 0037609.<br />

318<br />

Testimony of Jamie Dimon, “A Breakdown in Risk Management: What Went Wrong at JPMorgan Chase?”<br />

before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, S.Hrg. 112-715 (June 13, 2012)(“In<br />

December 2011, as part of a firm wide effort and in anticipation of new Basel Cap[ital] requirements, we instructed<br />

CIO to reduce risk weighted assets and associated risk.”); 2013 JPMorgan Chase Task Force Report, at 2.<br />

319<br />

For more information about RWA, see Chapter II.<br />

320<br />

Id.. See also 2013 JPMorgan Chase Task Force Report, at 26-27.<br />

321<br />

JPMorgan Chase Task Force interview of Bruno Iksil, CIO (partial readout to Subcommittee on 8/27/2012);<br />

12/22/2011 email from Bruno Iksil to Achilles Macris and Javier Martin-Artajo, “urgent -----: Rwa,” JPM-CIO-PSI<br />

0001227. See also FDIC presentation, “JPMC & COMPANY CIO Synthetic Credit Portfolio,” at 2, FDICPROD-<br />

0001783 (“The firm believed that due to the historical correlation (beta) of the tranches of the IG-9 index, they were<br />

getting into a neutral position by going long 4-5 times the high yield short positions.”).<br />

322<br />

12/22/2011 email from Bruno Iksil to Achilles Macris and Javier Martin-Artajo, “urgent -----: Rwa,” JPM-CIO-<br />

PSI 0001227. The profit and loss volatility would potentially increase, because, as the portfolio grew larger, even<br />

small changes in the price of individual holdings could translate into large variations in the portfolio’s overall value.<br />

323<br />

JPMorgan Chase Task Force interview of Bruno Iksil, CIO (partial readout to Subcommittee on 8/27/2012).<br />

324<br />

Id.<br />

325<br />

Subcommittee briefing by JPMorgan Chase (8/15/2012) (Jeannette Boot).<br />

326<br />

See 1/31/2012 email from Jaymin Berg, OCC, to Fred Crumlish, OCC, “CIO Quarterly Meeting,” OCC-SPI-<br />

00004695 (summarizing quarterly meeting with CIO in which CIO Chief Financial Officer John Wilmot indicated<br />

that, in 2012, the CIO expected to reduce the RWA of its “MTM” book, which included the SCP, from “$70B<br />

[billion] to $40B”).<br />

327<br />

See 1/18/2012 email from Bruno Iksil, CIO, to Julien Grout, CIO, “Meeting materials for 11am meeting,”<br />

conveying presentation entitled, “Core Credit Book Highlights,” prepared by Mr. Iksil, at JPM-CIO-PSI 0000100<br />

(indicating CIO’s RWA was then $40.3 billion); JPMorgan Chase Task Force Report, at 28, footnote 30 (indicating

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