17.03.2013 Views

JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES

JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES

JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

200<br />

period of time, the CIO’s Global CS01 limit was $12 million. The SCP first breached the CIO<br />

Global CS01 limit on January 18, 2012, breached it again on January 25, and stayed in breach<br />

until May when that risk limit, too, was replaced. 1114<br />

In response to the January breaches, the CIO traders requested an increase in the CS01<br />

risk limits to end the breaches. On January 27, 2012, CIO trader Bruno Iksil, apparently<br />

confused over the level of the limit, emailed Mr. Martin-Artajo with the request:<br />

“I will need an increase in the CS01 limit in order to reduce further the notionals<br />

and set the book for a smoother P&L path. I am currently constrained by this<br />

limit of [$]10M[illion] CS01 that prevents me from having a decent convexity of<br />

spreads tighten mostly.” 1115<br />

According to the JPMorgan Chase Task Force Report, “At various times, beginning in<br />

February, CIO Market risk suggested a temporary increase in the mark-to-market (“MTM”)<br />

CSBPV limit, from $5 million to $20 million, $25 million or $30 million.” 1116 These Global<br />

CS01 limit increases were not granted. However, the CIO traders were also not required to exit<br />

any positions in order to end the breach. Instead, the dual CS01 breaches were allowed to<br />

continue and grew more and more egregious. In fact, despite written guidelines requiring the<br />

CIO to “take immediate steps toward reducing its exposure to be within the limit,” 1117 the CIO<br />

traders pressed on in their trading strategy and continued to purchase additional credit<br />

derivatives. Indeed, on January 30, 2012, Mr. Iksil sent Mr. Martin-Artajo an email with the<br />

subject line, “there is more loss coming in core credit book,” warning of losses due to other<br />

market participant aligning against the CIO to “go for the fight.” Mr. Iksil wrote: “Now I just<br />

grow the exposure and the CS01 moves up.” 1118<br />

On February 13, 2012, Syed Hassan in the bank’s Market Risk Management group sent<br />

an email with the subject line, “CIO Global Credit spread BPV limit breach- COB 02/09/2012,”<br />

to Keith Stephan, the Chief Risk Officer in the CIO’s London office, and others, asking them<br />

about the ongoing CS01 breaches and requesting an explanation. Mr. Hassan wrote:<br />

“The following CIO Global Credit Spread BPV limits have been breaching since<br />

the aforementioned period. Can you please examine and confirm the breaches as<br />

valid? If so, please also provide some commentary surrounding the breaches.<br />

Thanks.” 1119<br />

Needed,” JPM-CIO-PSI-H 0000627, at 636.<br />

1114 Id.<br />

1115 Undated internal document authored by Bruno Iksil with his personal notes and comments on SCP trading<br />

activities from January to March 2012, JPM-CIO-PSI 0021884. See also 2013 JPMorgan Chase Task Force Report,<br />

at 37, footnote 48.<br />

1116 2013 JPMorgan Chase Task Force Report, at 81.<br />

1117 See, e.g., 3/2012 presentation prepared by JPMorgan Chase entitled “Market Risk Limits,” at 13, OCC-SPI-<br />

00117682.<br />

1118 1/30/2012 email from Bruno Iksil, CIO, to Javier Martin-Artajo, CIO, “there is more loss coming in core credit<br />

book,” JPM-CIO-PSI 0001225.<br />

1119 2/13/2012 email from Syed Hassan, CIO, to Keith Stephan, CIO, and others, “CIO Global Credit spread BPV<br />

limit breach- COB 02/09/2012,” JPM-CIO-PSI 0001825.

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!