JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES
JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES
JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES
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275<br />
respond to regulators’ questions about the SCP, and included Mr. Braunstein on his email, 1548<br />
but JPMorgan Chase never produced it. 1549<br />
Net Long Posture. Mr. Braunstein explained to the Subcommittee that JPMorgan<br />
Chase, by its very nature as a bank which loans money, was “long” credit, because when credit<br />
1550<br />
deteriorated, the bank lost money. In contrast, a portfolio that held a “short” credit position<br />
generally gained money when credit deteriorated. On April 5, 2012, in anticipation of the press<br />
articles due to be published the following day, 1551<br />
Ms. Drew sent Mr. Dimon, Mr. Braunstein,<br />
and other members of the JPMorgan Chase Operating Committee an email on April 5 stating:<br />
“The book has been extremely profitable for the company …. Going into the<br />
[financial] crisis we used the book to hedge ... credit widening .... Post December<br />
as the macros scenario was upgraded and our investment activities turned pro risk,<br />
1552<br />
the book was moved into a long position.”<br />
Mr. Braunstein told the Subcommittee that he was sure he read the email, though he was not<br />
1553<br />
aware of this particular sentence.<br />
The Subcommittee staff asked JPMorgan Chase’s officials to reconcile how the SCP<br />
could simultaneously be both “long,” and serve as a hedge in 2012, when the bank itself was<br />
“long.” If the SCP had the same overall long exposure as the bank overall, the SCP would lose<br />
money when the bank lost money, instead of offseting the bank’s losses. The Chief Risk Officer<br />
for the firm, John Hogan, and his deputy, Ashley Bacon, conceded that they could not reconcile<br />
1554<br />
the SCP holding a long position and also functioning as a hedge for the bank. Similarly, John<br />
Wilmot, the Chief Financial Officer of the CIO, was unable to do so. 1555<br />
Joseph Bonocore, the<br />
former Chief Financial Officer for the CIO and the former Treasurer for JPMorgan Chase, stated<br />
that he did not believe the book could both be long and maintain a hedge against losses in a<br />
1548<br />
4/10/2012 email from John Hogan, JPMorgan Chase, to John Wilmot, CIO, Douglas Braunstein, JPMorgan<br />
Chase, Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan Chase, and others, “Materials for FED/OCC Questions,” JPM-CIO-PSI 0001021.<br />
1549<br />
Subcommittee interview of Scott Waterhouse, OCC (9/17/2012). See also Subcommittee interview of Michael<br />
Kirk, OCC (8/22/1012); 4/10/2012 email from Michael Kirk, OCC, to Fred Crumlish, OCC, and others, “CIO info<br />
on elephant trade,” OCC-00004730 (Mr. Kirk: “What would be helpful would be to see the stress scenarios without<br />
these assets, and with these assets so one can understand the impact. … It would also be helpful if the CIO could<br />
provide some indication of a present target level they are trying to achieve, and hence the change of activity that<br />
resulted in the same (in other words results prior to and after recent trades.).” Mr. Crumlish: “In my response on<br />
JPM email …. I also said it would be useful if they provided analytics or a summary that recapped the hedge<br />
strategy, such as the expected impact of the hedge on the projected stress loss identified. I asked for this on the call<br />
as well.”); see 4/10/2012 email from Fred Crumlish, OCC to Scott Waterhouse, OCC, and others, JPM CIO trades,<br />
OCC-00004087 (“We asked the bank for a number of items yesterday that reflect details on the trades and support<br />
the stress loss hedge rationale associated with this particular strategy.”).<br />
1550<br />
Subcommittee interview of Douglas Braunstein, JPMorgan Chase (9/12/2012).<br />
1551<br />
4/5/2012 email from Ina Drew, CIO, to Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan Chase, and others, “CIO,” JPM-CIO-PSI<br />
0000539 (“I want to update the operating committee on what is going on with the credit derivatives book in CIO<br />
especially given a wsj article which will come out tomorrow.”)<br />
1552<br />
4/5/2012 email from Ina Drew, CIO, to Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan Chase, and others, “CIO,” JPM-CIO-PSI<br />
0000539.<br />
1553<br />
Subcommittee interview of Douglas Braunstein, JPMorgan Chase (9/12/2012).<br />
1554<br />
Subcommittee interview of John Hogan and Ashley Bacon, JPMorgan Chase (9/4/2012).<br />
1555<br />
Subcommittee interview of John Wilmot, CIO (9/11/2012).