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JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES

JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES

JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES

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22<br />

deposits. 49 By 2012, the CIO was managing a portfolio of approximately $350 billion, a historic<br />

high. 50 According to the OCC, the enormous size of this $350 billion portfolio would make the<br />

CIO alone the seventh largest bank in the country. 51<br />

The CIO was formerly part of the bank’s internal treasury function, but was split off into<br />

52<br />

a stand-alone office in 2005. According to JPMorgan Chase, its Treasury office and the CIO<br />

perform similar tasks in terms of managing the bank’s assets, but the Treasury office focuses<br />

more on shorter-term asset liability management. 53 In 2012, JPMorgan Chase’s proxy statement<br />

described the CIO and its Treasury office as follows: “The Chief Investment Office and<br />

Corporate Treasury are responsible for managing the Firm’s liquidity, interest rate and foreign<br />

exchange risk, and other structural risks.” 54 A March 2012 internal JPMorgan Chase<br />

presentation on “CIO 2012 Opportunities and Challenges,” prepared by the CIO, stated that the<br />

CIO’s “key mandate” was to: “[o]ptimize and protect the firm’s balance sheet from potential<br />

losses, and create and preserve economic value over the longer-term.” 55<br />

CIO Investment Portfolios. In its March 2012 presentation, the CIO described<br />

managing nine investment portfolios spanning an investment horizon that extended from the<br />

56<br />

shorter term to the longer term. At the short end of the horizon, the CIO indicated that it<br />

maintained “North America” and “International” portfolios, whose assets were “mainly in mark<br />

to market accounts.” 57 In the medium-term, the CIO presentation indicated that the CIO had a<br />

“Strategic Asset Allocation” portfolio, which was a portfolio used to “manage the Firm’s<br />

structural risk exposures” using assets that were “[m]ainly available-for-sale.” 58 Also included<br />

in the medium-term horizon were portfolios of assets used to hedge the bank’s activities relating<br />

to foreign exchange and mortgage servicing rights. 59 On the longer-term investment horizon, the<br />

CIO presentation indicated that the CIO maintained a portfolio to fund the bank’s retirement<br />

plans; a portfolio to maximize “tax advantaged investments of life insurance premiums”; and a<br />

private equity portfolio that, by 2012, was characterized as “in run-off mode.” 60<br />

A final<br />

component of the CIO’s longer term horizon was a portfolio of “Special Investments,” which<br />

49<br />

Subcommittee interview of Ina Drew, CIO (9/7/2012).<br />

50<br />

Subcommittee interview of Scott Waterhouse, OCC (9/17/2012).<br />

51<br />

Id.<br />

52<br />

Subcommittee briefing by JPMorgan Chase (8/15/2012) (Harry Weiss).<br />

53 Id.<br />

54 5/15/2012 JPMorgan Chase 2012 Proxy Statement, “Board’s Role in Risk Oversight,” at 11,<br />

http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/2265496134x0x556146/e8b56256-365c-45aa-bbdb-<br />

3aa82f0d07ea/JPMC_2012_proxy_statement.pdf.<br />

55 Mar. 2012 “Directors Risk Policy Committee – CIO 2012 Opportunities and Challenges,” prepared by Ina Drew<br />

and Irvin Goldman, CIO, JPM-CIO-PSI 0015015.<br />

56 Id.<br />

57 Id.<br />

58 Id.<br />

59 Id.<br />

60 Id; Subcommittee interview of Fred Crumlish, OCC (8/28/2012). According to Ina Drew, the private equity<br />

portfolio was added to the CIO in 2010, at the request of Mr. Dimon. Subcommittee interview of Ina Drew, CIO<br />

(9/7/2012).

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