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JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES

JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES

JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES

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82<br />

the positions and the traders’ limited options: “We look at what we can do ... while not growing<br />

the positions especially in IG9. The solutions are very limited.” 522<br />

Yet, on March 19, 2012, Mr.<br />

Iksil wrote that perhaps they should increase the book’s long positions even more:<br />

“One solution would be to let the book be really long risk, yet this would not be in<br />

a liquid market and may increase the P&L noise especially in corrections .... The<br />

523<br />

solution proposed amounts to be longer risk.”<br />

The CIO did just that, executing a series of trades over a couple of weeks in March that<br />

were so large that the OCC described them internally and to the Subcommittee as “doubling<br />

524<br />

down” on the SCP’s already losing trading strategy. The first involved the acquisition of an<br />

$8 billion notional long position in the most recent North American Investment Grade index<br />

series – not the IG9, but the IG17. 525 The second involved an even newer IG index series, the<br />

IG18, which was first issued on March 20, 2012, and in which the CIO acquired a $14 billion<br />

notional long position. 526 On top of that, the CIO acquired a massive $18 billion long position in<br />

the corresponding iTraxx series of credit indices. 527<br />

Altogether, in a few weeks, these trades<br />

increased the notional size of the SCP by $40 billion.<br />

Mr. Iksil later explained to the JPMorgan Chase Task Force investigation that he had<br />

switched from the IG9 index to the more recent series to be “less noticeable” to the rest of the<br />

528<br />

market. He explained that he had sold so much protection in the IG9 index that he believed<br />

the other credit traders “knew” his position, and were taking advantage. 529<br />

In fact, on March 19,<br />

522<br />

3/15/2012 email from Bruno Iksil, CIO, to Javier Martin-Artajo, CIO, “Update on Core,” JPM-CIO-PSI<br />

0000386.<br />

523<br />

3/19/2012 email from Bruno Iksil, CIO, to Javier Martin-Artajo, CIO, “Core Book analysis and proposed<br />

strategy,” JPM-CIO-PSI 0001234-35.<br />

524<br />

6/29/2012 email from Elwyn Wong, OCC, to Scott Waterhouse and others, OCC, “2nd Wilmer Hale Call,” OCC-<br />

SPI-00071386 (“Macris told Braunstein the majority of the positions were taken in Jan and Feb but we now know<br />

the doubling down in March.”); Subcommittee interviews of Scott Waterhouse, OCC (9/17/2012), Michael Sullivan<br />

and Douglas McLaughlin, OCC (8/30/2012); OCC Presentation to the Subcommittee, page entitled, “1Q2012,”<br />

(noting that “CS01 Exposure nearly doubled . . . between March 14 and March 28”), PSI-OCC-06-000028. See also<br />

2013 JPMorgan Chase Task Force Report, at 41 (indicating the CIO traders had reasoned they could “put on a large<br />

position very quickly near the roll date (March 20)” in order to stem the SCP’s losses and reduce the SCP’s VaR and<br />

RWA totals prior to the bank’s quarter-end public filings).<br />

525<br />

See 2013 JPMorgan Chase Task Force Report, at 42; Subcommittee briefing by JPMorgan Chase (8/15/2012)<br />

(Jeanette Boot). See also 3/22/2012 email from Peter Weiland, OCC, to Irvin Goldman, OCC, “I would like to<br />

understand the increase in positions in credit,” JPM-CIO-PSI 0000410-411 (reporting that the SCP’s notional CDX<br />

IG position – which includes a variety of IG on and off-the-run holdings – had increased from $22.4 billion on<br />

March 7, 2012, to $52.1 billion on March 21, 2012, a $30 billion increase in two weeks).<br />

526<br />

See 2013 JPMorgan Chase Task Force Report, at 42; Subcommittee briefing by JPMorgan Chase (8/15/2012)<br />

(Jeanette Boot). See also 3/22/2012 email from Peter Weiland, OCC, to Irvin Goldman, OCC, “I would like to<br />

understand the increase in positions in credit,” JPM-CIO-PSI 0000410-411.<br />

527<br />

See 2013 JPMorgan Chase Task Force Report, at 42. See also 3/22/2012 email from Peter Weiland, OCC, to<br />

Irvin Goldman, OCC, “I would like to understand the increase in positions in credit,” JPM-CIO-PSI 0000410-411<br />

(reporting that the SCP’s notional iTraxx MN position had increased from $38.9 billion on March 7, 2012, to $45.7<br />

billion on March 21, 2012, a $7 billion increase in two weeks); 3/22/2012 email from Julien Grout to the CIO<br />

Estimated P&L mailing list, “CIO Core Credit P&L Predict [22 Mar]: +$82k (dly) -$276,990k (ytd),” JPM-CIO-E<br />

00014689-691, at 691(reporting an additional purchase of iTraxx long positions totaling $5.65 billion).<br />

528<br />

JPMorgan Chase Task Force interview of Bruno Iksil, CIO (partial readout to Subcommittee on 8/27/2012).<br />

529<br />

JPMorgan Chase Task Force interview of Achilles Macris, CIO (partial readout to Subcommittee on 8/28/2012).

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