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JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES

JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES

JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES

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74<br />

loss,” both because the long assets had gained value and, due to the premiums being paid by the<br />

short parties, were producing carry. 464<br />

465<br />

Mr. Iksil’s presentation then proposed executing “the trades that make sense.”<br />

Specifically, it proposed:<br />

“The trades that make sense:<br />

• sell the forward spread and buy protection on the tightening move<br />

o Use indices and add to existing position<br />

o Go long risk on some belly tranches especially where defaults may<br />

realize<br />

o Buy protection on HY and Xover in rallies and turn the position<br />

over to monetize volatility” 466<br />

This proposal encompassed multiple, complex credit trading strategies, using jargon that<br />

even the relevant actors and regulators could not understand. Because the traders themselves<br />

declined the Subcommittee’s request for interviews and were outside of the Subcommittee’s<br />

subpoena authority, the Subcommittee asked other current and former CIO personnel to explain<br />

the proposal. Ina Drew, CIO head, told the Subcommittee that the presentation was unclear, and<br />

467<br />

she could not explain exactly what it meant. Irvin Goldman, then the CIO’s Chief Risk<br />

Officer, told the Subcommittee that the presentation did not provide enough information to<br />

clarify its meaning. 468 Peter Weiland, the CIO Market Risk Officer, offered the explanation that<br />

Mr. Iksil was basically describing a strategy of buying low and selling high. 469<br />

No CIO official<br />

offered a more detailed explanation of the specific trading strategies set forth in the January<br />

proposal.<br />

The OCC told the Subcommittee that while it agreed the presentation was confusing,<br />

senior CIO management should have understood exactly what was being proposed before<br />

470<br />

allowing billions of dollars in trades, and should have been able to explain the presentation.<br />

The OCC provided the Subcommittee with its understanding of the proposed trading strategies as<br />

follows.<br />

Selling the forward spread: The presentation proposed buying credit protection in the<br />

471<br />

short term and selling credit protection in the long term.<br />

464<br />

Id. at JPM-CIO-PSI 0000161.<br />

465<br />

Id.<br />

466<br />

1/26/2012 email from Bruno Iksil, CIO, to Andrew Perryman, CIO, “credit book last version,” conveying “Core<br />

Credit Book Highlights,” (January 2012), prepared by Mr. Iksil, at JPM-CIO-PSI 0000161.<br />

467<br />

See, e.g., Subcommittee interview of Ina Drew, CIO (9/7/2012).<br />

468<br />

Subcommittee interview of Irvin Goldman, CIO (9/15/2012).<br />

469<br />

Subcommittee interview of Peter Weiland, CIO (8/29/2012).<br />

470<br />

Subcommittee interview of Michael Sullivan, OCC (8/30/2012).<br />

471 Id.

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