The Literary Mind.pdf

30 THE LITERARY MIND
understood through projection from physical image schemas. When we think
of someone as able to deal with a difficulty, we say, "He can break through that
psychological barrier if he wants to." In that case, will is understood as a physical
force and difficulty as a physical barrier, where the physical force (will) is strong
enough to break through the barrier (difficulty). Alternatively, we might say, "He
can overcome that if he tries." In that case, will is understood as a physical force
and difficulty as a physical barrier, where the physical force (will) is strong enough
and oriented suitably to flow over the physical barrier (difficulty). In either case,
we know from the force-dynamic image schema that the force continues past
the point of the barrier. It is therefore an inference that someone who "breaks
through" or "overcomes" a "barrier" will continue along his "path" toward his
"destination."
The projection of an action-story onto an event-story depends on the projection
of the image schemas of the first story onto the second story.
IMAGE SCHEMAS AND INVARIANCE
Just as we categorize events according to shared image schemas and actions
according to shared image schemas, so we project action-stories onto eventstories
in accord with their image schemas. We project image-schematic structure
from the action-story to give structure to the event-story, but under a constraint:
The result shall not be a clash of image-schematic structures in the target.
Let us consider an example, Robert Browning's poem "Porphyria's Lover,"
which begins:
The rain set early in to-night,
The sullen wind was soon awake,
It tore the elm-tops down for spite,
And did its worst to vex the lake.
In the source action-story, there is a causal link between the actor who tears
something down and the event of tearing down. This structure is image-schematic.
In the target event-story, there is a causal link between the wind and the falling
of the trees. This structure is image-schematic. Projecting one onto the other
creates no clash in the target, since they match. But we could not say, for example,
"The transparency of the wind tore the treetops down for spite," without provoking
objection or offering an explanation, because the expression asks us to
project an image-schematic causal link in the action-story onto two things in the
event-story that we cannot think of as causally linked. Anyone who found the
expression unobjectionable would have to be interpreting the target inventively