linked - Investigating the Terror

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S E C R E T // NOFORN // 20320915 Provided other material support to al-Qaida, e.g., recruiter, facilitator, propagandist, forger, financier, etc. o Associated with evidence of facilitation (movement/transit; paid for travel, arms, or supplies) or received such facilitation (beyond basic travel facilitation to Afghanistan) o Member of NGO other organization listed as providing support to terrorism Presence or attendance at al-Qaida and affiliated training camps in Afghanistan or Pakistan including, but not limited to: 30 o Al-Faruq (several al-Faruq Camps were in existence since the late 1980s) o Camp Malik o Derunta Camp o Khaldan Camp o Tarnak Farm o Torkham/Libyan Camp o Mes Aynak Camp o Training on the front lines o Received specialized al-Qaida training (e.g., bomb making, surveillance, etc.; implies having previously received basic training, which was a prerequisite for advanced training) o Received training with or under other al-Qaida personnel o Received training at a guesthouse or an unspecified or unknown training camp o Other training facilities as identified in assessments or intelligence reporting Non-Afghan carrying a weapon in Afghanistan Detainee has extensive international travels, especially if poorly detailed, unconvincing, or implausible 31 Other indicators as noted in assessments and intelligence reporting (U) Member of, or affiliation with, the Taliban or Anti-Coalition Militia (ACM) (S//NF) The following provides the primary indicators for assessing a detainee‟s membership or affiliation with the Taliban or ACM elements other than al-Qaida. Detainee admitted be Taliban Identified as a leader or member in the Taliban 32 Acknowledged or identified as serving under Taliban leadership Name found on Taliban documentation, such as membership lists Detainee has familial ties to Taliban officials 30 Some detainees have acknowledged their presence at a training camp, but deny receiving training in an attempt to show they were not affiliated with al-Qaida, even when confronted with reporting to the contrary. It is unlikely a detainee would visit a training camp, but then refuse to receive training for fear of being branded a spy. Follow-on training (advanced training) is an additional indicator of recruitment for al- Qaida membership. Basic training at an al-Qaida camp is an indicator for membership in al-Qaida, but should not be used as the sole determinant factor for such an assessment. 31 International travels can be an indicator of facilitator, courier, recruiting and operations activities such as surveillance of targets. 32 The identification of detainee as a governor, for instance, should be considered with the fact that governors commanded troops. S E C R E T // NOFORN // 20320915
S E C R E T // NOFORN // 20320915 Associations with Taliban or ACM leaders o Mullah Muhammad Omar o Al-Tayib Agha o Jalaluddin Haqqani o Khirullah Said Wali Khairkhwa (ISN US9AF-000579DP) o Mullah Berader o Mullah Dadullah Lang o Mullah Fazil o Mullah Muhammad Fazl (ISN US(AF-000007DP) o Wakil Ahmad Muttawakil (ISN US9AF-000548DP) o Various Taliban Ministries o Other leadership and key members as identified in assessments and intelligence reporting, including those assessed to have been conduits between Usama Bin Laden and the Taliban Associations with non-Taliban ACM organizations Association with Pakistan ISID, especially in the late 1990s up to 2003 Attendance at Taliban training camps or received training from a Taliban member, especially after 11 September 2001 Occupied Taliban support facilities Captured with other Taliban Possessed weapons, explosives, mines, etc. 33 Use of common Taliban cover stories o A simple farmer o Arrest was the result of a personal feud with an individual with good ties to the current Afghan government, US, or Coalition forces o A conscript 34 o Claimed to assist Taliban at the risk of personal harm o Simply served as a cook or supply clerk o Assumption and use of an alias Affiliation with Afghanistan narcotics trafficking 35 Provided financial support to Taliban forces Provided intelligence or conducted surveillance in support of hostile forces Provided logistical support, transportation, food services, etc (U) Other Indicators Requiring Consideration 33 Possession of an AK-47 is common in the region for Afghans. Therefore, it is important to identify types and quantities of weapons. 34 Though some detainee claims of conscription are true, the fact of conscription does not negate the fact of membership in the Taliban. ISN 092 is an example of a detainee who successfully applied the conscription cover story as a means to secure his release from US custody. He could not have done so without the support of other detainees willing to withhold information about him. 35 Connections to narcotics can be a fundraising platform for the Taliban and ACM elements, but cannot serve as the sole indicator for membership in the Taliban. S E C R E T // NOFORN // 20320915
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Contents Introduction by Tom Secker
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Introduction The bombing of the Wor
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information available at the time o
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The prosecution claimed that urea n
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a deliberately provoked act of terr
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Ironically, this Matrix also lists
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INTELWIRE.com
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INTELWIRE.com
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INTELWIRE.com
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INTELWIRE.com
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INTELWIRE.com
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INTELWIRE.com
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INTELWIRE.com
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INTELWIRE.com
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INTELWIRE.com
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9/11 Personal Privacy Current Class
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MEMORANDUM TO: FROM: SUBJECT: REF:
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MEMORANDUM TO: CA - Ms. Mary A. Rya
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-2- 9/11 Closed by Statute JAccordi
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With specific respect to sections 2
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-7- year. Cairo also reported that
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Series: Team 5 Files WITHDRAWAL NOT
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WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Expositio
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Series: Team 5 Files WITHDRAWAL NOT
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j jev. F 11—1 5—83) ttflu&tIOfl
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—LS—83) ntinuationofFD-302o1 AB
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v 11—3—83) ontinuationofFD-302o
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Blast Damage by Steven C. De Rosa T
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SECTION C: WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBI
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Williams testified that he had expe
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Personnel in the FBI Laboratory mad
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nitric acid and were noted undernea
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weights would have to be different
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If Dave was supervising, Dave was s
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the chemists specializing in the ex
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pounds of urea and 1694 pounds of n
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We have reached several conclusions
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where they had purchased urea or ni
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laboratory setting--would have been
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AGENT WILLIAMS: I don't recall. . .
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Williams claimed in his OIG intervi
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We conclude that Williams' VOD opin
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of explosive damage. By putting all
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That's my question, sir. AGENT WILL
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and one was C-4; and I had individu
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(iii) General Discussion Agent Thur
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velocity of detonation are just a t
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(2) Analysis MR. CAMPRIELLO: I didn
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completely shucked of the wrappers,
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explosive. [] Williams' use of the
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nitrate, the court was unable to pu
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AGENT WILLIAMS: Well, after looking
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(Italics added.) extracts of urine
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Although defense counsel's question
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the use of smokeless powder and lea
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Whitehurst and Burmeister then prep
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and sol[i]d probe/triple quadrapole
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dictation. Whitehurst acknowledged
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-. Q 3..-1G42) FEDERAL BUREAU OF IN
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D—302a (Rev i:—15—13) ontiflu
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FD—302a (Rev. 11—15-43) Continu
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FD—302a (Rev. 11—15.43) Contmua
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D—302a (Rev 11—15—83) intiriu
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FD—302a Rev 11—15—13) Contrnu
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FD—302a (Rev. 11—15—83) Conti
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D—302a (Rev. 11—15.43) nt1nu1tI
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FD—302a (Rev. 11—15—3) Contln
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FD—302& (Rev II 1543) Cotiuatio o
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'FD—302a (Rev. 11-.1S43) C Conimu
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. TRWO191 311 950210 Z:54 159H-TP-2
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TRW0191 511 950210 23:54 IWH-TP-216
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14 that the targets included both m
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Gulf War. If so, and if, as U.S. of
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ureaucracies that there was "no evi
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Abdul Rahman Yasin--Musab's brother
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