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The prosecution claimed that urea nitrate traces were found at the bomb site, conveniently fitting in with the chemicals they found at addresses linked to the accused. Whitehurst knew that they could not detect urea nitrate, only urea and nitrate separately. To demonstrate the laxity in their testing and conclusions he even sent samples, one including his own urine, to the lab for examination. He found that the answer came back: urea nitrate. Unless urine is an explosive capable of creating a 5000 square foot hole in a steelreinforced concrete parking lot then there are serious problems with the way the FBI formed their case in the WTC bombing trials. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General Report on the World Trade Center bombing investigation and the FBI crime lab, April 1997 In large part due to Whitehurst’s efforts to raise the issue of poor standards and corruption in the FBI crime lab the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General carried out an extensive investigation. Though they accused Whitehurst of exaggerating some of his claims, they did vindicate him on multiple cases including the WTC bombing and OKC bombing. This extract from the full report outlines what went wrong in the WTC bombing investigation. In particular the actions of SSA David Williams, an explosives examiner, were heavily criticized. Williams testified at the US vs Salameh et al trial and the DOJ OIG concluded that, ‘Williams gave inaccurate and incomplete testimony and testified to invalid opinions that appear tailored to the most incriminating result.’ There are so many problems with Williams’ testimony that it is difficult to summarise them better than the 60-page excerpt presented in this document collection but, for example: Williams lied about producing urea nitrate according to recipes found in manuals linked to the suspects; He made a wild guesstimation of the size and type of bomb used in the WTC based entirely on his own physical inspection of the scene; He made estimations of the size of the bomb that conveniently fitted the amounts of chemicals known to have been bought by some of the accused, less the amounts found at addresses after the bombing. Part Three: Ramzi Yousef FBI FD-302 detailing Ramzi Yousef interrogation, February 7 th -8 th 1995 While Ramzi was being flown back to the US after being arrested in Pakistan he was interrogated at length by the FBI. This 302 has formed the basis for almost every biography, profile and telling of the Yousef story since, and is therefore essential reading for all those interested in the case.
Yousef outlines most of his life, in particular from 1990 onwards, including the bombing of the WTC, the Manila airline bomb plot (Bojinka) and his other activities in the first half of the 1990s. It also details how for much of 1992, before coming to New York in September of that year, he was undergoing explosives training in camps in Afghanistan. He also mentioned, tantalisingly, that there was another co-conspirator in the WTC bombing plot who the FBI did not know about. This additional person has never been identified, let alone charged, at least officially. They may not even exist – Yousef was in the habit of investing entire terrorist groups and claiming responsibility for things in their name. One man who is relevant to think story but almost certainly isn’t the extra man Ramzi told the FBI about is Ali Mohamed. Ali was involved at the Al- Kifah for years, knew the Blind Sheikh and trained almost everyone involved in the WTC bombing, the Kahane assassination, the ‘Day of Terror’ plot and others besides. He ran classes at the Al-Kifah where he used training manuals stolen from Fort Bragg, where he had served in the US Special Forces from 1986-89. List of unindicted co-conspirators, US vs Rahman et al Ali Mohamed’s name is one of many on this DOJ list of unindicted coconspirators drawn up around the time of the US vs Rahman et al trial in 1995. Though he was subpoenaed as a witness for the defence and was discussed at some length during the trial (including allegation that he was working for the CIA), Ali never appeared at any of the WTC bombing trials. He was not arrested until September 1998, following the African embassy bombings, which he also helped orchestrate. Excerpts from US vs Ali Mohamed complaint and guilty plea These excerpts from the legal case against Ali Mohamed show that for much of 1992 Ali was in the same area of Afghanistan as Ramzi Yousef, where Ali was providing training including explosives training. As pointed out by JM Berger on Intelwire, it appears that when Yousef arrived in New York accompanied by fellow trainee Ahmed Ajaj, Ajaj was carrying explosives manuals that had been translated into Arabic by Ali Mohamed. While not conclusive evidence, this does suggest that Ramzi, like the rest of the WTC bombing gang, was trained directly by triple agent Ali Mohamed. This opens the door to the possibility that Ali was the mastermind behind the bombing – at a time when he still enjoyed the protection of the CIA and was in the US Army reserve. Given that everyone from his wife to his commanders at Fort Bragg to other members of Al Qaeda thought that Ali was a deep cover agent, this raises the possibility that the WTC bombing was
Page 2 and 3: Contents Introduction by Tom Secker
Page 4 and 5: Introduction The bombing of the Wor
Page 6 and 7: information available at the time o
Page 10 and 11: a deliberately provoked act of terr
Page 12 and 13: Ironically, this Matrix also lists
Page 14 and 15: INTELWIRE.com
Page 32 and 33: 9/11 Personal Privacy Current Class
Page 34 and 35: MEMORANDUM TO: FROM: SUBJECT: REF:
Page 36 and 37: MEMORANDUM TO: CA - Ms. Mary A. Rya
Page 38 and 39: -2- 9/11 Closed by Statute JAccordi
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Page 42 and 43: -7- year. Cairo also reported that
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Page 46 and 47: WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Expositio
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Page 51 and 52: j jev. F 11—1 5—83) ttflu&tIOfl
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Page 57 and 58: Blast Damage by Steven C. De Rosa T
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SECTION C: WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBI
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Williams testified that he had expe
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Personnel in the FBI Laboratory mad
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nitric acid and were noted undernea
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weights would have to be different
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If Dave was supervising, Dave was s
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the chemists specializing in the ex
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pounds of urea and 1694 pounds of n
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We have reached several conclusions
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where they had purchased urea or ni
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laboratory setting--would have been
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AGENT WILLIAMS: I don't recall. . .
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Williams claimed in his OIG intervi
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We conclude that Williams' VOD opin
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of explosive damage. By putting all
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That's my question, sir. AGENT WILL
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and one was C-4; and I had individu
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(iii) General Discussion Agent Thur
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velocity of detonation are just a t
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(2) Analysis MR. CAMPRIELLO: I didn
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completely shucked of the wrappers,
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explosive. [] Williams' use of the
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nitrate, the court was unable to pu
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AGENT WILLIAMS: Well, after looking
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(Italics added.) extracts of urine
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Although defense counsel's question
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the use of smokeless powder and lea
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Whitehurst and Burmeister then prep
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and sol[i]d probe/triple quadrapole
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dictation. Whitehurst acknowledged
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-. Q 3..-1G42) FEDERAL BUREAU OF IN
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D—302a (Rev i:—15—13) ontiflu
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FD—302a (Rev. 11—15-43) Continu
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FD—302a (Rev. 11—15.43) Contmua
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D—302a (Rev 11—15—83) intiriu
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FD—302a Rev 11—15—13) Contrnu
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FD—302a (Rev. 11—15—83) Conti
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D—302a (Rev. 11—15.43) nt1nu1tI
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FD—302a (Rev. 11—15—3) Contln
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FD—302& (Rev II 1543) Cotiuatio o
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'FD—302a (Rev. 11-.1S43) C Conimu
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. TRWO191 311 950210 Z:54 159H-TP-2
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TRW0191 511 950210 23:54 IWH-TP-216
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14 that the targets included both m
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Gulf War. If so, and if, as U.S. of
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ureaucracies that there was "no evi
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Abdul Rahman Yasin--Musab's brother
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Musab lived in the same building as
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[12] Of Passports and Fingerprints
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Logic and circumstance also suggest
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acknowledged in July having had an
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2. Indeed, there is good reason to
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Cover of the passport that Ramzi Yo
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Pages 3 and 4 of Ramzi Yousef’s p
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Pages 7 and 8 of Ramzi Yousef’s p
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Pages 10 and 11 of Ramzi Yousef’s
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The classification markings are ori
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