HN 2: The British and their Works

In any case, it was a stroke of luck that the trusteeship had fallen
to the British. Although the declaration passed by the victorious
Allies on 2nd August 1945, at the end of the Potsdam Conference,
stipulated that Germany’s arms industry should be crushed and
its industrial capacities restricted by dismantling factories, the
relevant authorities at the Foreign Office in London were convinced
that there was a close connection between the recovery
of England’s economy and the revival of Germany’s. The British
opposed the punitive approach of the American occupation
directive JCS 1,067, which prohibited the military government
from undertaking any measures for economic reconstruction
beyond the guarantee of a moderate standard of living. On
the contrary, they were prepared to avoid jeopardising the reconstruction
of Western Europe by offering considerable
support to those industrial sectors that were important for
the peacetime economy. 11 Evidence of this is provided by the
directive, adopted by the Economic and Industrial Planning Staff
in July 1945, but not issued on account of the forthcoming
Potsdam Agreement, concerning the treatment to be accorded
to German industry. This instruction was not dictated in the
spirit of the Morgenthau Plan, quite the contrary. It left to the
Military Government the decision as to which economic measures
should be regarded as essential, thus opening up a wide
room for manoeuvre. In practice this took the form of a
"constructive pragmatism" on the part of the occupying power. 12
And what could be more obvious than to meet the enormous
transportation requirements of the occupying power from a
functioning Volkswagen production plant, especially when this
opportunity was legalised by a clause in the Potsdam
Agreement? The course of the war had led the Allies from
Normandy to Germany, resulting in extensive wear to their
military vehicles. Replacements were not forthcoming. The new
two-seater all-terrain vehicle could not be produced before 1947;
the model used during the war was liable to breakdowns, and in
any case the manufacturer now preferred to build more
profitable vehicles. For a while the confiscation of German
civilian vehicles provided some relief, without being anything
like sufficient to meet the growing transportation requirements.
One way out of the transportation crisis could be a swift
re-start of Volkswagen production. 13
One of the most enthusiastic advocates of this solution was
Colonel Michael McEvoy, whose responsibility for the REME
workshops in the British zone made him aware of the urgent
need for extra transportation capacities. Furthermore, the qualified
automotive engineer had seen the Volkswagen at the
International Motor Show in Berlin in early 1939 and had fond
memories of it. It is thought that McEvoy approached the REME
officers at the Volkswagen plant at the end of July 1945,
instructing them to discuss a possible project with the factory
management concerning the production of 20,000 Volkswagens
for the British military government and German consumers.
14 The plan was that production should be increased from
an initial 500 vehicles in September 1945 to 2,000 in January
1946, and should remain at this level until September of the
same year. The REME had been instructed to submit a report by
6th August 1945, setting out the requirements for materials and
labour, stipulating the urgently needed supplies and offering
specific suggestions for completion of the project. This project
was actively supported by Major Ivan Hirst, who was just as keen
to produce the saloon as factory manager Rudolf Brörmann.
Instead of stating his case in words, Hirst had an unused saloon
found on the factory premises painted khaki at Colonel McEvoy’s