HN 2: The British and their Works
HN 2: The British and their Works
HN 2: The British and their Works
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3<br />
3.1<br />
Service <strong>and</strong> sales<br />
Important decisions for the future<br />
<strong>The</strong> Volkswagenwerk’s monopoly for the supply of vehicles to<br />
the Reichspost <strong>and</strong> Reichsbahn was shaken somewhat in mid-<br />
1947. This was a foretaste of the competitive situation which<br />
would once again prevail in the foreseeable future, <strong>and</strong> caused<br />
the head of the service department, Karl Feuereissen, to warn<br />
against underestimating Opel as a competitor. <strong>The</strong> Rüsselsheim<br />
motor manufacturer had, he said, an excellent service network<br />
<strong>and</strong> a dealer network which Volkswagen did not. 141 Feuereissen<br />
thus touched a raw nerve of vital importance to the plant’s<br />
future development. By the end of the war the Volkswagenwerk<br />
had only the beginnings of a service department <strong>and</strong> sales<br />
system to its name. Both were originally to have been set up<br />
by the German Labour Front. But the basis for this no longer<br />
existed, because the motorization of the people that Hitler<br />
promised failed to materialise due to the material <strong>and</strong> labour<br />
shortages caused by the war. Apart from a few symbolic vehicles<br />
for Party officials, series production of the saloon only started<br />
under <strong>British</strong> occupation. Actively supported by the trustees,<br />
the Volkswagen plant now concentrated on setting up a<br />
sales <strong>and</strong> service department in an attempt to reduce its rivals’<br />
substantial competitive lead.<br />
At the end of 1945, on Major Hirst’s initiative, the service<br />
department was set up. <strong>The</strong> Royal Engineers made valuable<br />
contributions to its development, having operated its own<br />
service department for the <strong>British</strong> Army in the REME workshop.<br />
142 <strong>The</strong> new department initially remained closely bound to<br />
the requirements of the Military Government. Because the<br />
Volkswagenwerk processed almost exclusively orders from the<br />
occupying powers, the Industry Division does not seem to have<br />
promoted its further expansion. Given the production conditions<br />
prevailing, the priorities lay elsewhere. This changed at a<br />
stroke in June 1946. <strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> ordered the management at<br />
short notice to supply the Volkswagen to <strong>British</strong> administrative<br />
departments at half-price, that is, 2,500 RM. This would depend<br />
on a monthly production of 4,000 vehicles, a part of which was<br />
to be released for civilian sales. <strong>The</strong> factory management had to<br />
calculate the price in such a way that it could recoup the losses<br />
from the comm<strong>and</strong>ed programme.<br />
Although this instruction took no account whatsoever of the<br />
actual production possibilities, the prospect of civilian business<br />
triggered a hectic burst of activity. <strong>The</strong> factory management<br />
pressed for the immediate establishment of a sales organisation<br />
<strong>and</strong> a service department for the civilian sector. Otherwise the<br />
Volkswagen would risk getting a bad name as a result of<br />
incorrect or inadequate repair, service <strong>and</strong> maintenance. 143 At<br />
the beginning of June 1946 Karl Feuereissen submitted his<br />
proposals for the establishment of a service organisation. In<br />
accordance with the provisions of the Highways <strong>and</strong> Highway<br />
Transport Branch, distributors <strong>and</strong> main distributors were to be<br />
appointed for certain areas, whose business policy was to be<br />
contractually regulated in close consultation with the