HN 2: The British and their Works

visional compromise permitted sale of the surplus production
to members of the British and American military government
for 100 pounds per car. This discount price was intended to
offset the fact that the Volkswagen could not be resold outside
of Germany. But this veto ultimately fell victim to the plans
for zonal amalgamation, because the Americans voted for unrestricted
sales at a realistic price. Under American pressure it
was decided in October 1946 to sell Volkswagens to the personnel
of the Military governments, the military missions and
the United Nations at the full export price of 160 pounds. Resale
was permitted, and in this way, indirectly, the first exports of the
Volkswagen had been approved. 58
The intended production increase to 2,500 vehicles per month
gave rise to more reservations than assent, not only from the
German factory management, as became apparent at the discussion
on 21st June 1946. Even Richard Berryman, the officer
responsible for production matters had his doubts, pointing to
the poor condition of the machine tools, many of which needed
overhauling. The available workforce, the food situation and
normal production problems would, according to Berryman,
permit a maximum daily production of 100 vehicles over the
next six months. Rudolf Brörmann advanced problems in toolmaking,
machine repair and the general maintenance of the
factory. In order to shift toolmaking and assembly from the
ground floor and to make preparations for the winter, first of all
the war damage to the buildings had to be repaired. He estimated
that 2,000 extra workers would be required. In the view of
the personnel management, even the 1,000-vehicle programme
would cause serious problems due to the high turnover rate in
the workforce. Neither the Military Government nor the labour
offices were able to meet the requirements for labour, because
the Volkswagenwerk did not enjoy sufficiently high priority.
There was still an acute housing shortage. There was also a
shortage of clothing, working overalls and footwear for the
existing workforce and especially for new recruits. However,
Major Hirst remained optimistic and issued the instruction to
draw up plans for a medium-term production target of 2,500
vehicles per month.
A tricky topic for the German management came at the close of
the discussion – in April 1946 the price of the saloon had been
adjusted to reflect the increased production costs. Hirst’s comments
were critical. As he said, the price of the car "could not
start and end with the statistical cost accounting". 59 The days
when you could sell a Volkswagen for 5,000 Reichsmark were
long gone. In fact the order had already been received to make a
drastic cut to Volkswagen prices. The Property Control officer
McInnes therefore announced that as of July 1946 the saloon
was to be sold for 4,000 Reichsmark. Since further instructions
to reduce prices were to be expected, the unnecessary costs
must be eliminated and the necessary costs "reduced to the bare
minimum". It was, he said, in the interest of the company if it
was managed on a financially sound and economical basis. 60
McInnes had touched a nerve. In recent months the Board of
Control had repeatedly called for a reduction of production
costs. The factory management had set up various investigations
– without success. In fact the overheads rose constantly in
April, May and June 1946. The Property Control officer therefore
26 27
THE IMPROVED UPSWING