HN 2: The British and their Works

The co-operation of the works council was also indispensable to
management for the internal transfer of employees from nonproductive
to productive departments. "If we have this
(co-operation)," said Münch, "then it will not fail through any
fault of ours". 128 The works council supported this measure,
because it saw it as an opportunity to place qualified people in
better wage groups. The management was required as far as
possible to employ every person in a position to which they were
suited, although the works council urged that implementation
should not be allowed to lead to losses in earnings. There was
little leeway for general improvements to incomes, as the Allies
had imposed a wage and price freeze throughout Germany.
Nevertheless, this did not prevent slight progress on the
subject of wage policy. The works council was therefore able to
negotiate for young people under 21 and women on piecework
at the Volkswagen plant to be paid the same wages as adult
male pieceworkers. 129
While in 1947 hunger and economic misery triggered strike
movements throughout Germany, Volkswagen weathered this
period without significant protest actions from its workforce.
Any attempts in this direction were successfully warded off by
management and works council jointly, and in this their work
was made easier by the composition of the workforce. The refugees
and freed prisoners of war relied on social fringe benefits
from the company, and in particular on the factory-owned
accommodation, a fact which dampened their enthusiasm for
strikes. 130 Significantly, the near-strike at the Vorwerk was not
about materialistic improvements, but was triggered by the
denazification procedure in Braunschweig where, in the view of
many union and works council members, an excessively lenient
verdict had been issued to two former SA men. In December
1947, therefore, the employee representatives discussed the
possibility of a strike in which the Vorwerk should also take part.
General manager Münch immediately contacted the works
council secretary Fritz Hesse and gave him to understand that a
strike "could be extremely disruptive at this time, because we
have the special programme for December to cope with." 131 In a
veiled threat he reminded Hesse that the Vorwerk had already
participated in the strike movement in April of that year, when
practically the whole of Germany was out. According to Münch,
the works council there had got away with it that time because
Münch had personally interceded with the Military
Government. Hesse and Münch were agreed that the strike
must be prevented. The works council intervened at the
Vorwerk, whereupon the workers voted against taking part. On
the same day, the general manager gave the Senior Resident
Officer the strike all-clear.
In Münch the works council found a kindred spirit who was also
striving for agreed solutions and preferred the way of industrial
peace. In the debate on the increase of working hours in mid-
1946 Münch pressed for the inclusion of the employees’ representation,
especially since the plans could only be implemented
with difficulty if it were to resist them. The works
council exploited this favourable situation to make progress in
the matter of co-determination in accordance with the Allied
Works Councils Act of April 1946. It was precisely this matter that
brought the negative aspect of British pragmatism to light, a
perfect example of which is the employee representation’s