HN 2: The British and their Works

the military government had dismissed relatively blameless
persons while more culpable individuals had remained in office,
the report noted, was also something which the workforce
found difficult to accept. 37
The Rudolf Brörmann case marked the boundary between a
pragmatic and a consistent denazification practice, in which
decisions could occasionally also be influenced by personal
motives. Indeed, looking back on the denazification committees’
work, Major Hirst remarked that the German authorities were
swayed by local politics. 38 The factory manager, whom he held in
high regard for his technical expertise, was unaffected by the
first wave of denazification measures, but was selected for
dismissal in June 1946. Brörmann protested against this
decision in vain; the tribunal in Lüneburg rejected his appeal.
Brörmann then approached Hermann Münch, requesting him
to find out the grounds for his dismissal. He said that he had
been unable to deduce from the appeal proceedings which
of the accusations had not been refuted. The general manager
intervened with Ivan Hirst, and on 2nd October 1946 was
informed that "precise grounds" for the failure of the appeal
were "not available". 39
Brörmann himself suspected a "left-wing conspiracy" organised
by Wilhelm Kiesel and directed against himself. 40 Münch
reported in June 1946 concerning a "motor vehicle belonging
to the municipal administration" with "persons unknown to
him" who had instituted enquiries concerning Brörmann in
Rüsselsheim. 41 However, suppositions of this kind went unheeded
by the British factory management. For the rest, Major Hirst
does not seem to have embraced the cause of Brörmann’s reinstatement.
He had made himself unpopular throughout the
workforce with his autocratic and disparaging attitude towards
employees, which cast doubt upon his suitability as factory
manager. Hans Hiemenz, the finance director at the time,
recalled a dispute between Hirst and Brörmann in this respect,
because a car being specially produced for Colonel Radclyffe was
taking a long time. The Senior Resident Officer pressed the
matter, whereupon Brörmann insulted him. It certainly seems
likely that Brörmann’s political past may not have been the
actual reason for his dismissal. 42
The second denazification wave in June 1946 also stimulated
developments towards government control of housing. For
some considerable time, the German factory management and
the relevant British authorities had been discussing a project
which, under the subsequent codename "Operation Wolfgang",
clarified both the fundamental features and the plight of the
British denazification policy. This was motivated primarily by
a need for security, and was directed against persons who represented
a threat to Allied policies in Germany.The enthusiasm
with which the Americans pursued denazification as an
"artificial revolution" was not shared by the British, because it
was very soon realised that the problem could not be solved
simply by replacing the elites, and that the economic necessities
set limits to denazification. From the British point of view,
"Operation Wolfgang" was an attempt to increase both public
security in Wolfsburg and the industrial production of the
Volkswagenwerk. The latter was only possible if housing was
provided for the urgently-needed workers.