HN 2: The British and their Works

attempts were not running to their satisfaction. Saloon production
was now to start with 1,000 vehicles in November 1945
and to increase to 4,000 vehicles per month from January 1946
onwards. 17 In fact the order for 20,000 Volkswagens in the
immediate post-war period was a well-nigh hopeless venture,
because the shortage of labour, food, living space and materials
made setting up series production impossible. Nevertheless,
the production commitments for the British enabled the
Volkswagenwerk to take its first faltering steps into an uncertain
future.
The British military government’s decision to meet its transport
requirements by producing saloons was by no means a foregone
conclusion because the assembly jigs, machinery and tooling
were set to manufacture the Kübelwagen, which was after all
an extremely useful mode of transport. However, production
of a military vehicle was not at all consistent with the British
military government’s perception of itself as a civilian administration
rather than a military occupying power. Furthermore,
the manufacture of saloon cars was reconcilable with the bans
on production stipulated in Potsdam, and provided a much
better argument to set against the calls for the dismantling of
German industry. At the beginning of October 1948 Hirst reacted
extremely touchily to a request from the Swedish motor manufacturer
Scania, who wanted to borrow an amphibious vehicle
for exhibition purposes. To his rejection of this request, the
senior resident officer appended the reasoning that exhibiting
the amphibious vehicle might lead certain persons to immediately
assume that the Volkswagenwerk was once again producing
armaments. 18 In this respect, the Volkswagen represented
the start of peacetime production under a democratic aegis,
before it developed into the symbol of the economic miracle in
the 1950s.
The Volkswagenwerk became a British "Regiebetrieb" – with all
the benefits associated with this status. The Military
Government arranged for the necessary credits for starting up
production, and by force of command removed many obstacles
of the "Kommandowirtschaft" (command economy). Because
the Volkswagenwerk was producing for the Allies, it was given
priority in the supply of scarce raw materials. This privilege
loosened the fetters of enforced government control since, like
most raw materials, the steel which was indispensable for
motor vehicle production was subject to a quota system, and
could only be obtained in exchange for "iron tickets" which Hirst
fetched from the Minden headquarters once a month. So, while
the living was from hand to mouth, the company did not starve
as other companies did.
These benefits of being a publicly operated undertaking were
supplemented by those inherent in the company itself. In the
course of the post-war plans, the Volkswagenwerk management
of the time had constructed a warehouse that was well stocked
and did not start running low until July 1946. Having its own
power station meant that production was largely immune to
the frequent power cuts of the post-war era, provided there was
sufficient coal available. For this reason, at the end of May 1945
the power station manager had applied to feed electricity
into the national grid, initially without success. Finally the
Military Government lent its weight, and it was agreed with
the "Braunschweiger Elektrizitätsgesellschaft" (Braunschweig
electricity company) that a high-tension cable should be laid.
This secured a better utilisation of capacities and more regular
fuel supplies for the power station. 19