HN 2: The British and their Works

The Control Commission for Germany did not look kindly
on barter deals, although the Volkswagen was a sought-after
object and could be exchanged for up to 150 tonnes of cement or
200,000 bricks. The CCG only approved such semi-legal practices
with extreme reluctance, the justified suspicion existing that
the vehicles destined for exchange were produced from materials
for the occupation programme. After several unsuccessful
attempts, at the end of July 1947 the factory management
renewed its demand to be allowed to divert a certain percentage
of production for the suppliers. The utmost speed was
dictated by the shortage of building materials for making the
factory winterproof. Major Hirst therefore approved the
suggestion of quickly building 25 "second-hand" cars from used
parts, and giving them to the building suppliers. 85 His reaction
was less conciliatory to the demands for the British quota for the
third quarter. If this was not received swiftly, and the military
government nevertheless insisted on the delivery of 1,000
vehicles, said Julius Paulsen, then the quotas for the mining
industry and the German market would have to be used for this.
Hirst commented laconically that "things looked serious for the
mining industry and the German market". 86 Hermann Münch
pointed out the mining industry’s right of purchase, which
Major Hirst countered with the threat that the vehicles could be
requisitioned.
Meanwhile, it was hardly possible any longer to speak of sheet
metal "stocks". In July 1947, with a great effort, it had been
possible to put 1,025 vehicles through the checkpoint, so that the
mining industry could be recompensed with at least 25 vehicles
for the allocated quotas. Because for this purpose some sizes of
blanks had had to be processed until there were none left at all,
various bodywork lines had run out, and at the beginning of
August closed down for some days. This gave rise to serious
criticism on the part of the Senior Resident Officer and the
question as to why production had not been throttled back
earlier. In fact the factory management had firmly expected a
delivery of new materials. But because there was no material
buffer stock, the unexpected and rigorous power cuts of recent
weeks made themselves felt with a vengeance. 87 This also affected,
among others, the rolling mills of Eichen and Ohle which
had also been given orders to supply the Russian and French
zones, and which thereupon had to withdraw the promises
made to the Volkswagenwerk. Because the development of raw
materials and energy supply could not be predicted, Leonhard
Kemmler drew the entirely sensible conclusion that "any
practical planning of a production increase over the coming
months is out of the question". 88 Following his advice, production
in August was throttled back to 800 vehicles. Thus the
British instruction to increase monthly production to 2,500
vehicles in the coming year was finally done for.