HN 2: The British and their Works

ests of the workforce, while the Director of Human Resources, as
a member of the factory management, was expected to look
after company interests. Secondly, the British regarded themselves
as temporary trustees and did not want to present a
future board of management with a fait accompli in this key
issue. 136
Even Heinrich Nordhoff, who took over as general manager on 1st January 1948, strenuously opposed the appointment of a
Director of Human Resources. In his relations with the works
council and the union he was less concerned with conciliation
than his predecessor Münch. His paternalistic style of leadership
was ruled by his firm conviction that "there is no alliance more
natural than that between a factory management and its
employees". 137 This alliance was doubtless assisted by the fact
that the pay scale at the Volkswagenwerk rose far beyond the
West German average after the Allied wage freeze was lifted in
October 1948. In August of that year, the factory management
and works council had already agreed on a general wage increase
of 15 per cent. In subsequent negotiations, the employee
representation managed to achieve wage increases of up to 50
per cent for the lower wage groups. 138
The policy of the new general manager was not the only
problem the works council was faced with. Disputes between
communists and social democrats additionally impaired its
work. At the works council elections of June 1948 the socialdemocratic
majority in the "IG Metall" (metalworkers’ union)
pushed through, against previous custom, a list overwhelmingly
composed of its members. This led to the setting up of an
opposing list, in which the CDU and KPD candidates, together
with the independents, presented themselves. The "election
campaign" turned into a real mudslinging match, with the
participants hurling mutual accusations of corruption.
Nordhoff took advantage of the weakened employee representation
to gradually restrict its influence and to move committee
powers into his area of responsibility. He achieved this without
any major resistance from the works council which was intent
on reconciliation, lacking both the workforce backing for a
course of confrontation and the enthusiasm to engage in
conflict. However, Sührig, the union secretary who came to
Wolfsburg in 1949 on the orders of the IG Metall central
governing body in search of an aggressive confrontation with
Nordhoff, failed to carry the employee representation or the
Volkswagen plant workforce with him. 139
More even than the troubles between social democrats and
communists, the growing influence of extremist right-wing
candidates threatened to test the VW works council to its limits.
At the works council elections of 1948 a grouping made its first
appearance which regarded itself as a union opposition list.
These groups were boosted by the results of the local government
elections of November 1948, in which the "Deutsche
Rechtspartei" (German Right Party – DRsP) won a landslide
victory in Wolfsburg, polling 64 per cent of the votes. Because
the mood among the workforce gave rise to fears of a similar
debacle at the works council election in May 1949, the IG Metall
and the Deutsche Angestellten Gewerkschaft (German
Employees’ Union) reserved places on their joint list for six extreme
right-wing candidates, five of which were elected to the
works council. This strategy of neutralising opposing forces by
inclusion was ultimately a sign of weakness. There was no union