HN 2: The British and their Works

from abroad. The Volkswagen plant was able to take direct
advantage of some of the export proceeds in the form of a
discretionary export bonus which was in urgent demand, for
example for the importation of scarce materials. On account of
the supply of sheet metal, and of dispensing with the equipment,
this order could run more swiftly through production. The
provision of materials by the importer accounted for only a
small part of the export proceeds. What was decisive for the
assessment of this business remained, in Kemmler’s view, the
currency gains to be achieved. 184 This trade presumably came to
grief for the same reason which also caused the Electrobel deal
to fall through. When the British officers visited the Belgian steel
works, accompanied by representatives of the importer and of
the Brussels government, it transpired that the works were
already working flat out for the British automotive industry.
They therefore refused the government representatives’ request
to supply sheet steel to Wolfsburg. 185
Despite these setbacks the British military government stood
by the decision, approved by London, to crank up Volkswagen
saloon exports. At the end of July 1947 Hirst informed the factory
management that the occupation requirements for vehicles
were contracting, and would be covered by the end of the year.
The car production capacities thus freed would be split equally
between export and the German market, after the British
military government including REME had been supplied as a
priority. However, Major Hirst strictly ruled out sales to the international
black markets, on which the Volkswagen fetched
between 20,000 and 30,000 Reichsmark. Hirst warned that this
sort of business, while promising the highest dollar rates, would
backfire in the long run. In agreement with the Joint Export
Import Agency (JEIA), founded in Frankfurt following zonal
amalgamation, the Board of Control favoured an export
business via representative importers "on the basis of sound
business principles, although this would mean correspondingly
reduced currency proceeds". The British believed this was the
only way to guarantee a sound, sustainable export business. The
JEIA was prepared to purchase material abroad in order to raise
the quality standard in terms of paint finish, upholstery etc. It
remained an open question to what extent the export bonus of
10 per cent should be applied. The objections of the Ministry of
Trade and Supply were stilled by restricting the use of the
imported materials for export vehicles only. 186
In the meantime, at the Volkswagenwerk, the preparations for
the export business had begun. At a meeting with representatives
of the Economic Administrative Office in June 1947, general
manager Münch had received the official notification that the
order for 1,000 cars for the French military government had
been cancelled, and that instead 500 export vehicles were to be
produced: 200 for Holland and 300 for Belgium. Because the
standard version of the Volkswagen did not meet the expectations
of foreign customers in terms of equipment and appearance,
the committee consisting of Paulsen, Striebig and
Feuereissen was asked to come up with suggestions for the
development of an export model. Time was of the essence,
because it was intended to present the Volkswagen at the forthcoming
trade fair in Hanover. 187 Another key point was touched
on by the factory management during a meeting in mid-July
1947: the Volkswagen’s far from glorious past. After the occupation
of half of Europe by the Nazis, its reputation as the
"Führer’s" favourite toy could prove a millstone. The question