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HN 2: The British and their Works

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Under the pressure of the material crisis, in early August 1947<br />

Ivan Hirst instructed the factory management to produce 30<br />

second-h<strong>and</strong> vehicles for the suppliers that month, "as fast as<br />

possible <strong>and</strong> by any means". 89 Although new parts also had to be<br />

used for this, he h<strong>and</strong>led the order generously. At the same time,<br />

the <strong>British</strong> had decided to provide the suppliers <strong>and</strong> the mining<br />

industry with 25 vehicles each. Once again, however, the distribution<br />

system created complications. Major Hirst made it<br />

clear that the quota allocation would be controlled centrally by<br />

the Highway <strong>and</strong> Highways Transport Branch in future <strong>and</strong><br />

processed by the State Economic Office. <strong>The</strong> previous direct<br />

allocation of the quotas via the mining industry had "not gone<br />

to plan", especially since these quotas had been set aside for<br />

another purpose. <strong>The</strong> vehicles intended for the mining industry<br />

now had to be allocated via the German Central Administration<br />

for Roads <strong>and</strong> Transportation in accordance with the regulations.<br />

This led to further delays. 90<br />

This tug-of-war was gradually exhausting the patience of the<br />

supply headquarters of the German mining industry. At the end<br />

of September 1947 general manager Münch paid them a visit in<br />

order to prevent the threatened transfer of the orders from the<br />

Volkswagenwerk to Opel. It was after all an important sales sector<br />

for the future. In order to meet the obligations to the mining<br />

industry, he instructed the production manager Wilhelm<br />

Steinmeier to exceed the m<strong>and</strong>atory production, if possible in<br />

October 1947. But Münch had clearly "misread the situation",<br />

<strong>and</strong> Major Hirst made it clear to him that all backlogs of the<br />

comm<strong>and</strong>ed programme must first be cleared before anybody<br />

else got a single car. Furthermore he criticised the unauthorised<br />

undertakings made to the mining industry, <strong>and</strong> put the factory<br />

management in its place. He pointed out that the Volkswagenwerk’s<br />

vehicle output was distributed by the Allied authorities,<br />

<strong>and</strong> the board of management was not authorised to enter into<br />

negotiations with other institutions. 91 Despite these complaints,<br />

the major fleet purchasers – the mining industry, the post office<br />

<strong>and</strong> the railways – remained customers of the Volkswagenwerk,<br />

for the likely reason that there were no real alternatives.<br />

With the production slumps in August, October <strong>and</strong> November<br />

1947, the Volkswagenwerk now had the worst of the battle<br />

behind it. <strong>The</strong> materials situation eased up. And in December,<br />

with the vigorous support of the workforce <strong>and</strong> the works<br />

council, production was increased to 1,020 vehicles. Ultimately,<br />

1948 had brought with it the upswing that everybody had been<br />

waiting for.<br />

■<br />

38 39<br />

SHORTAGES OF RESOURCES

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