HN 2: The British and their Works

compared to other manufacturers. Major Hirst had visited the
exhibition, accompanied by Colonel Radclyffe, to ascertain a
suitable price for the export saloon. The market analysis indicated
that the Volkswagen was comparable with the Skoda, which
now became the benchmark for determination of prices. 190
In fact there could hardly have been a worse moment to start up
the export business with Volkswagens. In August 1947 the
material supply crisis was at its height, for which reason, on the
advice of Kemmler and Steinmeier, production was throttled
back to 800 vehicles and the commanded programme of 1,000
vehicles per month was postponed by six months. Once again, at
the beginning of September 1947, the British had to correct the
already revised instruction to increase monthly production to
2,500 vehicles by July 1948. In agreement with the representatives
of the Joint Export Import Agency and the VAW planning
department, it was now firmly resolved to affect the production
increase during the coming year. Prior to this the occupation
requirements were to be reduced to 300 vehicles per month,
leaving the rest available for export and for the German market.
General manager Münch suggested reducing the ordered programme
slightly and making up the deficit at a later date, so as
to be able to export some vehicles immediately. Major Hirst
rejected this on the grounds that firm resolutions had already
been adopted in this matter. In December 1947, in respect of
raw material allocations for the export and civilian business,
there was a yawning gap of 3,350 tonnes of steel. One reason
for this was the provision that steel quotas for vehicles intended
for export were to be supplied by preference where a firm
contract existed. In the case of planned deliveries, however, the
^
Economic Administrative Office only released small quantities.
Colonel Charles Radclyffe immediately set about procuring the
necessary quantities of steel from them. 191
The number of vehicles exported in 1947, given in the statistics
as 1,963, is misleading, because as of June the vehicles delivered
to the civilians connected with the Military Government were
accounted via the export procedure. Of the 126 cars "exported"
in June, 116 went to British families and 10 to the foreign press. 192
The expectations which above all the British had placed in the
export business since the middle of the year were not fulfilled.
In numerical terms the export of Volkswagens in 1947 was negligible.
However, the figures were unimportant when set against
the fact that export had been finally pushed through in the face
of the ministerial resistance which had been encountered, and
was at last able to get going properly in 1948. It may even be that
this delay was a good thing in the long run. The factory management
had sufficient time to transform the standard version into
a model fit for export. In order for the Volkswagen to survive
among the foreign competition, a series of cosmetic measures
was implemented. The export cars were far better crafted and
equipped, from the paintwork and an appealing selection of
finishes, to the upholstery, and the chromium-plated bumpers
and hubcaps. With this constant insistence on improving the
quality of the vehicles destined for export, Major Hirst made a
decisive contribution to establishing Volkswagen’s good reputation.
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THE EXPORT QUESTION