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The majority of foreign (that is to say, non-Afghan and non-Pakistani) fighters in<br />
Afghanistan were ethnic Arabs from heartland Arab states such as Egypt, Saudi<br />
Arabia, Jordan, and Syria, but significant numbers of mujahidin also came from<br />
northern Africa, Europe, the Caucuses, and Southeast Asia. In March 1985, the<br />
war reached its bloodiest phase. In response, Saudi recruiting of foreign fighters<br />
intensified and agencies such as the Rabitah stepped up their efforts to recruit<br />
and finance foreign fighters. As a result, funding was seldom a problem for<br />
Sungkar and Ba’asyir, but they were nevertheless careful about who they sent to<br />
Afghanistan. In many ways, those in their first several groups represented the<br />
crème-de-la-crème of their community—those with the best English and Arabic<br />
language skills and greatest capacity to teach. This was deliberate, for it was<br />
these men who translated key texts and instructed later students. 16 Those who<br />
were sent in the first three years included future JI leader Zulkarnaen (Aris<br />
Sumarsono), DI leader Syawal Yasin, Bali bomber Muchlas (Ali Gufron), and JI<br />
strategist Hambali.<br />
New recruits were processed through the “service-base” (Maktab al-Khidmat) in<br />
Peshawar set up in 1984 to support foreign mujahidin, and headed by the<br />
Palestinian close-confident of Usama bin Ladin, Abdullah Azzam. One of the<br />
most important ideologues of the jihadist movement, Azzam re-articulated the<br />
concepts first put forth by Sayyid Qutb and linked them to the contemporary<br />
context. Most Southeast Asians who went to Azzam’s base were familiar with his<br />
writing, which had already shaped their thinking.<br />
Almost all of the Southeast Asian mujahidin, and certainly all of those later<br />
associated with JI, trained in sections of camps established especially for them by<br />
the Saudi-backed leader Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, such as Camp Saddah in the<br />
Khumran Agency district of Pakistan. 17 Sayyaf’s network was one of the weakest<br />
in Afghanistan, but he had some of the best Saudi connections of the Afghan<br />
leaders. Furthermore, he understood the needs of his Southeast Asian brothers.<br />
He divided Camp Saddah into separate “tribes” (qabilah) or self-sufficient<br />
quarters, for those from North Africa, for those from the Middle East, and for<br />
those from Southeast Asia. Students in the camps spent part of their time<br />
studying contemporary jihadist writings (such as those by Abdullah Azzam)<br />
together with classical Salafi texts (such as works by Ibn Taymiyya), and part of<br />
16<br />
International Crisis Group (2002), 5.<br />
17<br />
International Crisis Group, “Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still<br />
Dangerous,” Asia Report N°63, 26 August 2003, 3.<br />
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