to terrorism. Islamists were at the forefront of the independence struggle in both Indonesia and Malaysia, and terrorism is not unique to the extremists of the Muslim faith. Not only is militant Islam in Southeast Asia scattered, but it is also confined to small and marginalized groups… 69 69 Hussin Mutalib, “Misunderstood: Political Islam in Southeast Asia,” Harvard International Review 28, no. 2 (Summer 2006), 84. 73
Ideology, Religion, and Mobilization in the Southern Thai Conflict Joseph Chinyong Liow Introduction Since 2004, violence has become a regular occurrence along Thailand’s southern border. A rejuvenated separatist movement, the BRN-Coordinate (Barison Revolusi National-Coordinate or National Revolutionary Front-Coordinate) is believed to have sparked the recent wave of violence on 4 January with a raid on a military camp; following the BRN assault, bombings, targeted killings, arson and attacks on military convoys has become commonplace. Indeed, violence in the provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat has accounted for more than 3,000 deaths to date, and shows no signs of abating. Although the conflict is relatively low intensity in nature, the ongoing violence deserves attention, particularly for the absence of any claim of responsibility by its perpetrators. Moreover, while analysts and observers mostly agree that the BRN-Coordinate has emerged as a major actor in the violence, some have argued that several newer groups may 1 have surfaced and are playing a major part in the conflict. Another ambiguous feature of the conflict in southern Thailand is the relative dearth of information regarding the key ideological drivers of the fighting. Unlike their counterparts in other regional clashes, including separatists in Aceh, Irian Jaya (or West Papua), and Mindanao, as well as religiously-inspired extremists such as members of Jemaah Islamiyah, insurgents in southern Thailand have not articulated the ideological underpinnings of their groups’ violence. Based on present evidence, the southern Thai conflict does not appear to coalesce around the vitriolic religious ideology of an Abu Bakar Bashir, a religio-political blueprint such as that mapped out by the late Salamat Hashim and currently being set in motion by the MILF in the southern Philippines, or a coherent separatist agenda similar to the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Aceh Freedom Movement) struggle. Given this absence of a clear ideological leader or platform, any serious attempt to uncover the impetus to the southern Thailand conflict would predictably be an arduous task, compounded further by the murky nature 1 According to a range of reports, some of these groups include Hikmatullah Abadan, RKK (Runda Kumpulan Kecil), Pemuda, Thai United Southern Underground, and most recently, the Mujahidin Shura Council of Southeast Asia and Patani Malay Consultative Congress. A useful typology of the degree of organization and institutionalization of the ongoing insurgency is provided by Duncan McCargo. See Duncan McCargo, Tearing the Land Apart: Islam and Legitimacy in Southern Thailand (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008), 168-74.
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THE COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER AT W
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Table of Contents Preface 3 The Lan
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The Landscape of Jihadism in Southe
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nationalist aims rather than a glob
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Extremist Islam in Malaysia is a re
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The first article, by Rohan Gunarat
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The Current and Emerging Extremist
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Mecca in 1979, the continuing Arab-
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answers to such questions as: Who s
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in 1999 by the son of the leader of
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Indonesian friends some of who I ca
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