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died in 1999, Ba’asyir lacks conviction in pursuing practical jihad and backs
down when faced with risks. 18 They are unhappy with Ba’asyir’s decision to join
with Irfan Awwas in forming the MMI and aligning that group with proestablishment
(that is to say, recognizing the practical legitimacy of the
Indonesian state) political Islamists. This faction’s fears were confirmed when, in
the wake of the Singapore arrests and revelations about Omar al-Faruq’s
confessions in the September 2002 issue of Time magazine, Ba’asyir argued
fervently against proceeding immediately with bombings of Western targets.
At the same time, many within JI were uncomfortable with the large number of
Indonesian Muslim victims of the October 2002 bombing in Bali and subsequent
attacks. Many also felt that the bombings were counterproductive, causing the
Indonesian authorities to clamp-down on JI’s local jihad and training operations
in Sulawesi.
Regardless of this important internal debate, JI remains unambiguously a jihadi
Islamist group constructed on paramilitary lines convinced that it represents part
of an army of God fighting a state and a world that has made itself an enemy of
God and of true religion. It believes in the necessity and religious legitimacy of
using pre-emptive violence when tactically and strategically opportune. It wishes
to be seen as a champion of Islam and Muslim interests, and it seeks the support
of allies in the broader Islamic community. For operational and ideological
reasons, JI knows that it needs to master public relations and win “hearts and
minds.”
JI has a history of conducting terrorist bombing attacks and will likely conduct
further bombings in the future, but this is not the only, or even preferred,
method of conducting jihad. Aside from violent jihad, JI also sees itself as an
organization committed to dakwah, i.e., preaching and teaching. The collapse of
the Suharto regime in May 1998 opened up new opportunities for JI to pursue its
outreach aims in Indonesia.
The 12 October 2002 bombing in Bali, which targeted foreigners, represented JI’s
first large-scale attack against the “far enemy.” Follow-up bomb attacks on
foreign targets took place in 2003, 2004, and 2005, but none achieved the impact
of the 2002 bombing. As explained above, these far enemy major attacks were
controversial within JI. Ba’asyir evidently did not believe that the 2002 attack
made good tactical or strategic sense. The younger bombers, however, did not
18
(ICG Dec 2002:3)
46