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espondents in religious schools (67.0 percent) said that they believed that the<br />

American actions in Iraq and Afghanistan represented attacks on Islam. 27 When<br />

it came to the proposition that “Western countries, primarily the United States<br />

and Great Britain, are the root cause of religious violence in Muslim countries<br />

(such as bombings in Indonesia and in Middle Eastern countries),” four out five<br />

(80 percent) agreed, whereas only one in ten (10.1 percent) were critical of Usama<br />

bin Ladin and prepared to agree that he was an “actor of violence in the<br />

world.” 28 A remarkable two out of three of these respondents at Islamic<br />

educational institutions affirmed that they “support the foundation of an Islamic<br />

state and the implementation of sharia as advocated by Darul Islam (DI), Negara<br />

Islam Indonesia (NII), Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), Front Pembela Islam<br />

(FPI) and Laskar Jihad (LJ).” 29<br />

Clearly, there is much deeper support for jihadi ideas within Indonesia’s<br />

pesantren, madrasah and Islamic colleges than one might hope. For the reasons<br />

outlined at the beginning of this chapter, it seems likely that this apparent<br />

support for radical jihadi Islamism is a product of long-established social<br />

conservatism in NU and theological conservatism within Muhammadiyah.<br />

27<br />

Ibid., 28.<br />

28<br />

Ibid.<br />

29<br />

Ibid., 20. On Laskar Jihad refer tp Laskar Jihad see: Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad: Islam,<br />

Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia<br />

Program, 2006); also refer to Saiful Umam, "Radical Muslims in Indonesia: the Case of Ja'far<br />

Umar Thalib and Laskar Jihad", Explorations in Southeast Asian Studies, vol.6, no.1 (Spring<br />

2006). For broader studies of Laskar Jihad, other jihadi militia and militant Islamism refer to:<br />

Zachary Abuza, Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia (London: Routledge, 2007); Greg Fealy,<br />

“Militant Java-based Islamist Movements”, in A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast<br />

Asia, ed. Andrew Tan (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2007): 63-76; Greg Fealy, “Half a Century of<br />

Violent Jihad in Indonesia: An Historical and Ideological Comparison of Darul Islam and Jema'ah<br />

Islamiyah”, in Islamic Terrorism in Indonesia: Myths and Realities, ed. Marika Vicziany and David<br />

Wright-Neville, CSEAS Annual Indonesia Lecture Series, number 26 (Melbourne: Monash Asia<br />

Institute, 2005): 15-31; Greg Fealy and Anthony Bubalo, Between the Global and the Local: Islamism,<br />

the Middle East, and Indonesia, Analysis Paper No. 9, The Brookings Project on U.S. Policy Towards<br />

the Islamic World (Washington D.C.: The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at The Brookings<br />

Institution, 2005); Greg Fealy and Aldo Borgu, Local Jihad: Radical Islam and Terrorism in Indonesia,<br />

(Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2005); and Martin Van Bruinessen, “Genealogies<br />

of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia”, South East Asia Research 10, no. 2 (2002): 117–24.<br />

On FPI see: Jajang Jahroni et.al., "Defending the Majesty of Islam: Indonesia's Front Pembela<br />

Islam (FPI) 1998-2003", Studia Islamika vol. 11, no. 2 (2004): 197-56; and Ian Douglas Wilson, “The<br />

Changing Contours of Organised Violence in Post New Order Indonesia”, Murdoch University<br />

Asia Research Centre Working Paper No. 118 (April 2005) .<br />

49

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