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Organization), formed in 1968. Notably, the founding leaders of these two
groups were both Islamic religious teachers. Groups such as BNPP (Barisan
Nasional Pembebasan Patani or National Liberation Front of Patani) and GMIP
(Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani or the Mujahideen Movement of Patani) would
later emerge as the separatist movement expanded. An attempt in the 1990s to
form an umbrella organization to bring these disparate groups together through
the formation of Bersatu (also known in some sources as the United Front for the
Liberation of Patani) failed from the outset, a victim of factionalism and
competition both across its constituent groups as well as within them. 4
While there are clearly continuities between previous epochs of resistance and
the contemporary insurgency, it is the differences that have proven most striking.
Tactically, the current generation of insurgents have been considerably more
brutal and indiscriminate than their predecessors. Contemporary groups have
been known to select targets where there is a high risk of “collateral damage” to
civilian lives and infrastructure. Furthermore, the insurgency itself has
transformed from a rural-based guerrilla struggle to an urban resistance
movement; in cities, insurgents can melt easily into the population, thereby
making intelligence gathering much more difficult.
The Importance of Determining the Role of Religion in the Southern Thai
Insurgency
Given the murky nature of the conflict in southern Thailand, absence of any
claims of responsibility on the part of its perpetrators, and lack of clearly
articulated objectives and goals, scholars and analysts continue to debate the key
ideological drivers underpinning the southern insurgency. Against the backdrop
of the emerging transnational threat of al-Qa’ida and the corresponding
American-led “global war on terror,” uncertainty about the religious dimensions
to the conflict in the Muslim-majority provinces of southern Thailand has
garnered increasing interest.
Fixation with the religious dimension to the southern Thai conflict stems, in large
part, from the fact that the chief avenue of recruitment for the current insurgency
is widely believed to be Islamic religious schools. 5 For instance, in April 2007,
4
For more information about the separatist movements active in southern Thailand, see
International Crisis Group, “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad,” International Crisis
Group, Asia Report no. 98 (18 May 2005).
5
In recent times, it seems that, beyond Islamic schools, recruitment venues have included
teashops and village-based social events.
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