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ever demonstrating how and why a pious Malay-Muslim takes the gargantuan
leap to militancy and violence. At the same time, those who link the Thai conflict
to Islamism fail to explain why the conflict has remained contained in southern
border provinces, or why the Malay-Muslims of southern Thailand—both
insurgents and common folk—have refused to acknowledge the mediating roles
that their non-Malay co-religionists elsewhere in Thailand have offered to play.
This is not to say that religion does not play a role in the conflict – religious
dogma cannot be detached from ethno-cultural references. Rather, religion
animates the narrative of Malay ethno-nationalism, injecting further meaning
and intelligibility into the drive for self-determination. The next section of this
chapter analyses the role that religion plays in the southern Thailand conflict.
Attempting to Measure the Actual Impact of Religion on the Southern Thai
Conflict
Islamic Schools and Scholars
As noted above, the central Thai government suspects that Islamic schools in the
southern provinces are key vehicles for the indoctrination and recruitment of
new insurgents. To a certain extent, such concerns are well earned. For instance,
young men who attended a weekend Islamic school recalled in a 2006 interview
how an uztaz (Islamic religious teacher) spoke passionately about the moral
obligation of the “anak Patani” (children of Patani) to take back Patani from the
kafir Siamese.
9
This ustaz further demanded unquestionable loyalty to the cause
of the liberation of Patani from the occupying forces. 10 Nevertheless, evidence
suggests that most recruitment in religious schools is a highly decentralized
process involving small, unofficial study groups. 11 As a recent study of southern
Thailand conducted by the International Crisis Group explains:
Recruitment agents, often religious teachers, reportedly select
youths who display three key characteristics: piety,
impressionability, and agility. Agents recruit these youths into
small groups, initially by befriending and inviting them to join
discussion or prayer groups. Candidates are sounded out in
conversations about Patani history. Those who seem receptive to
9
“Alone in the Shadow of Militants,” The Nation, 21 May 2006.
10
Ibid.
11
Interview with Thai Special Branch, Bangkok, 13 July 2005.
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