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Finally, the author of the pamphlet asserts that jihad in the Philippines should<br />

have a transnational dimension. Such a struggle must never be confined to a<br />

secessionist goal, but must be tasked with spreading the faith throughout the<br />

world and annihilating man-made laws and governments. The author contends:<br />

The Mujahedeen will not fight for the sake of the Bangsamoro only<br />

or any tribe or nationality. Islam has no borders, no tribalism, no<br />

nationalism, or any ism! The Mujahedeen are fighting the enemies<br />

of Allah for the sole purpose to implement the divine laws, which<br />

is the Shariah, legislated by God the Almighty Allah for the entire<br />

human race, applicable to Muslims and non-Muslims, it is a perfect<br />

law! For Allah is perfect. 22<br />

ASG’s Tactics<br />

The second way that ASG distinguishes itself from MNLF and MILF is through<br />

its choice of tactics. Perhaps most prominently, ASG follows an interpretation of<br />

Islam that justifies the killing of infidels and depriving them of their<br />

possessions.<br />

23<br />

Accordingly, ASG, unlike MNLF and MILF, has rejected any<br />

prospect of negotiating a peaceful settlement to the Mindanao conflict with the<br />

Philippine government. Furthermore, ASG has engaged in a variety of criminal<br />

activities, including kidnapping for ransom; murder; hostage-takings; extortion<br />

of peasants, businessmen, and fishermen; the cultivation of marijuana; and<br />

rape. 24<br />

ASG did not always rely on criminal tactics, and it is believed that the change in<br />

its behavior over the past decade is largely a result of a decline in foreign support<br />

and the death of Abubakar Janjalani. As mentioned above, ASG received<br />

financial and material support from foreign sources, including al-Qa’ida, in the<br />

early 1990s. 25 ASG’s ties to al-Qa’ida were severed, however, following Ramzi<br />

22<br />

Ibid., 23.<br />

23<br />

Ibid., 35.<br />

24<br />

For more detailed accounts of the Abu Sayyaf’s violent activities in Mindanao, see Turner, 388-<br />

390; Christopher A. Parrinello, “Enduring Freedom,” Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin 28,<br />

no. 2 (April-June 2002), 3-4,<br />

http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=1&sid=3&srchmode=1&vinst=PROD&fmt=4&st;<br />

Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror (Boulder, Colorado; London,<br />

UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 111-13.<br />

25<br />

See Niksch, 14.<br />

61

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