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Finally, the author of the pamphlet asserts that jihad in the Philippines should<br />
have a transnational dimension. Such a struggle must never be confined to a<br />
secessionist goal, but must be tasked with spreading the faith throughout the<br />
world and annihilating man-made laws and governments. The author contends:<br />
The Mujahedeen will not fight for the sake of the Bangsamoro only<br />
or any tribe or nationality. Islam has no borders, no tribalism, no<br />
nationalism, or any ism! The Mujahedeen are fighting the enemies<br />
of Allah for the sole purpose to implement the divine laws, which<br />
is the Shariah, legislated by God the Almighty Allah for the entire<br />
human race, applicable to Muslims and non-Muslims, it is a perfect<br />
law! For Allah is perfect. 22<br />
ASG’s Tactics<br />
The second way that ASG distinguishes itself from MNLF and MILF is through<br />
its choice of tactics. Perhaps most prominently, ASG follows an interpretation of<br />
Islam that justifies the killing of infidels and depriving them of their<br />
possessions.<br />
23<br />
Accordingly, ASG, unlike MNLF and MILF, has rejected any<br />
prospect of negotiating a peaceful settlement to the Mindanao conflict with the<br />
Philippine government. Furthermore, ASG has engaged in a variety of criminal<br />
activities, including kidnapping for ransom; murder; hostage-takings; extortion<br />
of peasants, businessmen, and fishermen; the cultivation of marijuana; and<br />
rape. 24<br />
ASG did not always rely on criminal tactics, and it is believed that the change in<br />
its behavior over the past decade is largely a result of a decline in foreign support<br />
and the death of Abubakar Janjalani. As mentioned above, ASG received<br />
financial and material support from foreign sources, including al-Qa’ida, in the<br />
early 1990s. 25 ASG’s ties to al-Qa’ida were severed, however, following Ramzi<br />
22<br />
Ibid., 23.<br />
23<br />
Ibid., 35.<br />
24<br />
For more detailed accounts of the Abu Sayyaf’s violent activities in Mindanao, see Turner, 388-<br />
390; Christopher A. Parrinello, “Enduring Freedom,” Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin 28,<br />
no. 2 (April-June 2002), 3-4,<br />
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=1&sid=3&srchmode=1&vinst=PROD&fmt=4&st;<br />
Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror (Boulder, Colorado; London,<br />
UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 111-13.<br />
25<br />
See Niksch, 14.<br />
61