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of the conflict and the mystery surrounding the identity of the perpetrators.
Given that caveat, the limited amount of material available in the form of
booklets and pamphlets detailing to varying degrees the motivations of some
actors can be supplemented with interviews of insurgents from both the previous
generation of separatist fighters and those involved in the current conflict. The
combination of these sources can provide a fairly cogent map of some ideological
pillars of the ongoing insurgency. Indeed, paucity of material notwithstanding, it
is increasingly urgent that careful, considered analysis of the underlying
motivating factors to the conflict be undertaken. This is especially true when
considering the Thai state’s visible inability to make structural and sustainable
headway in counter-insurgency operations. 2 It is with this process in mind that
this chapter attempts a preliminary mapping exercise by analysing jihadi ideas
and texts that have surfaced in southern Thailand, investigating the ideological
underpinnings of indoctrination and recruitment in the insurgency, and
assessing the overall religious character of the ongoing conflict in Thailand’s
southern Muslim-majority provinces. The chapter posits two arguments: first,
while there have been attempts among the insurgents to reference religious
ideas, for the most part these are local in nature, centring on local ideas and
vehicles of transmission; second, while religious metaphors and jihadi ideas are
salient features to meta-narratives depicting the violence in southern Thailand as
a “religious conflict,” this should not distract from the highly-localised ethnonationalist
and political objectives that lie at its heart.
History from the Patani Perspective
In many respects, what we witness today in southern Thailand is but the latest
manifestation of latent, longstanding tension between the Bangkok-based central
government and a once fiercely independent Malay-Islamic sultanate that was
brought under Siamese control through a mixture of coercion as well as political
and diplomatic machinations. Simply put, it is the struggle for self-determination
along ethno-cultural lines that remains at the heart of the problem in the
southern border provinces.
The population of southern Thailand is predominantly ethnic Malay-Muslim,
thereby differentiating it from the rest of the country. Historically, the
provinces—once collectively known as Patani Darussalam—enjoyed various
2
The degree of success is debateable, and the Thai government has attempted to enact programs
favorable to the Malay-Muslim community.
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