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eligious referents to the ongoing conflict – one oblique (Jihad Sabillilah) and the
other overt (Berjihad di Pattani) – have surfaced in the theatre, thereby possibly
indicating the lack of exegetical underpinnings to the conflict beyond general
calls to “jihad.” Of note is the relative lack of reference to the writings of Sayyid
Qutb, viewed by many as the standard bearer of Muslim militancy, in the
southern provinces. Indeed, while Qutb’s Milestones has been translated for Thai
consumption, this was done by the Young Muslim’s Association of Thailand
(YMAT), one of the most popular, government-sanctioned Muslim organizations
in the country. Moreover, the translation was done, curiously enough, in Thai
and not Jawi, thereby paradoxically limiting its accessibility in the southern
provinces. 51
Second, insofar as ideological underpinnings have been articulated and/or
penned, they have been locally generated. In southern Thailand, armed jihad, the
clarion call of Muslim militants, is referenced in terms of local conditions rather
than broader themes, such as the Dar al Islam/Dar al Harb conflict. The books
investigated above were written in Jawi (the local Malay language), and in the
case of Berjihad di Pattani, the discussion is confined to the historical kingdom of
Patani Darussalam. Third, insofar as the struggle is made with religious
referents, they are both Salafi and Sufi in theological orientation. In turn, this is
further indicative of: (1) absence of any sort of theological coherence or
overarching religious ideology; and (2) a rather disparate character to the
insurgency, which includes religious and nationalist elements, and even within
the religious group there are differences.
51
The following remarks were those of a member of the YMAT Advisory Council who was
describing the misperceptions on the part of the Thai government towards the inspirational
contribution that Milestones allegedly made to Thai Muslim society: “They [the Thai government]
only wanted to see the militant side of Qutb and his language of revolution. But we saw a moral
message in his work. The Thai authorities didn’t understand that Qutb’s work was a response to
the problem in the Arab society. We, on the other hand, were not interested in carrying out a
revolution. We are a minority, religiously speaking, in this country. The Arab Muslims were the
majority in the Middle East and his message was in response to their predicament. We don’t view
ourselves as some immigrants coming here to profit from the land. In other words, we don’t
challenge the notion of the Thai nation-state. We are just trying to carry out work to ensure the
continuity and strengthening of our community in Thailand.” Interview with Saravud Sriwannayos,
Bangkok, 27 May 2008. For a study of transnational Islamic networks in southern
Thailand, see Joseph C. Liow, “Local Networks and Transnational Islam in Thailand,” in
Transnational Islam in South and Southeast Asia: Movements, Networks, and Conflict Dynamics, (ed.)
Peter Mandaville et al., NBR Project Report (Seattle, W.A.: The National Bureau of Asian
Research, 2009).
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