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motivation. 66 Moreover, without a central leader or amir, ASG’s ideological and
religious motivation diminished, replaced by pure and simple greed. 67
Meanwhile, in March 2005, the Philippine National Police raided RSM
headquarters in Quezon City, thwarting a terrorist plot during the Holy Week
and leading to the arrest of key RSM members. This breakthrough has since
substantially weakened RSM as an Islamic extremist group. 68
Conclusion
An analysis of reading materials seized from ASG and RSM provide strong
evidence of these groups’ affinity with transnational jihadist ideologies. Given
ASG’s earlier ties with al-Qa’ida and later with RSM, it is not surprising that the
materials captured from the groups were mostly culled from or inspired by the
works of Azzam and, by implication, Qutb; however, both groups have crudely
and mechanically adopted the ideas of these two jihadist ideologues without
subjecting their beliefs to critical analysis or any creative modifications.
Evidently, they are not familiar with the more recent works of contemporary
jihadist ideologues from the Middle East, North America, and Southeast Asia,
which implies that ASG and RSG are marginalized groups operating at the
fringes of both international and domestic Islamic movements. Internationally,
these two groups have lost their earlier connections with al-Qa’ida because of
ASG’s bandit-like behavior and bin Ladin’s decision to shift his organization’s
focus and efforts from the Philippines to other parts of Southeast Asia as a matter
of tactical exigency. Domestically, the two jihadist groups have failed to
influence the larger and more popular secessionist movement, the MILF, which
is still primarily motivated and guided by ethno-nationalism rather than a
jihadist ideology as it negotiates a peace agreement with the Philippine
government. ASG’s involvement in criminal activities and banditry by the late
1990s has raised further doubts about its credibility as a jihadi group. Moreover,
U.S. military assistance to the AFP has resulted in the neutralization of its leaders
and potential ideologues. Overall, the study of ASG and RSM lends credence to
Professor Hussin Mutalib’s observation that:
Misperception abounds concerning radical Islam in Southeast Asia.
Political Islam in this region is neither new nor necessarily related
66
“AFP; Abu Sayyaf Largely Degraded but Stull a Threat in Mindanao,” 28.
67
Ibid.
68
See Banlaoi (2007b).
72