Where is R2P grounded in international law? Anne-Marie Judson A ...

SUMMARY
R2P is not a new doctrine. This can be seen by the attempts to clarify the rights,
duties and responsibilities of states in the early stages of the United Nations General
Assembly debates and the International Law Commission’s proposals on state
responsibility.
The research in the second chapter clarified that states have responsibilities in
international law through attribution to acts or omissions of the state in question. This
complements the R2P World Summit outcome whereby states firstly have the
responsibility to prevent and protect their citizens from harm. This chapter showed
how ‘responsibility’ is not a new idea and that it is well grounded in international
opinions and juris. The draft declaration on rights and duties of a state showed that
responsibility has been a concern of the United Nations General assembly since 1946.
This linked in with the International Law Commission through their magnum opus on
state responsibility. The first Special Rapporteur, Garcia Amador and the second,
Roberto Cohen showed how responsibility entailed the whole area of international
law. They clarified that obligations erga omnes or jus cogens rules were applicable to the
prevention of genocide and that this was binding on all states.
The rulings of courts as explained in the second chapter also showed how willing the
courts were to adopt responsibility as international law. This clarified that
responsibility not only entailed duties but also obligations that could manifest into
breaches and violations of international law inherently threatening peace and
international security. Prevention was shown as commitment to implement
international jurisdiction into local legislation and education and breaches included
omissions, actions, and the failure to act. Attributions included once again omissions,
actions and the failure to act including the failure to implement, direct, control and
manage persons or people carrying out governmental authority. The acceptance of
actions could equate to attribution as was seen in the Tehran case. This also showed
how states can be attributed responsibility even when they did not initially instigate
the violation or breach.
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