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Empirical Issues in Syntax and Semantics 9 (EISS 9 ... - CSSP - CNRS

Empirical Issues in Syntax and Semantics 9 (EISS 9 ... - CSSP - CNRS

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discussion <strong>in</strong> the next section). But what this properly describes is the expectation that<br />

monotone decreas<strong>in</strong>g quantifiers cannot be topics because their m<strong>in</strong>imal witness set is the<br />

empty set ∅, which as such cannot be fetched <strong>in</strong>to the predicate at all.<br />

The classification of topical quantifiers is further developed <strong>in</strong> Endriss (2009). Follow<strong>in</strong>g<br />

Kadmon (1985), Endriss claims that all generalized quantifiers <strong>in</strong>troduce (plural) discourse<br />

referents (i.e. m<strong>in</strong>imal witness sets which are accessible <strong>in</strong> subsequent sentences). Even if all<br />

quantifiers create plural discourse referents, the latter are not of the same type for all<br />

quantifiers. 11 Quantifiers are dist<strong>in</strong>guished accord<strong>in</strong>g to their ability to create exhaustive <strong>and</strong><br />

non-exhaustive plural discourse referents. Consider the mean<strong>in</strong>g differences <strong>in</strong> the<br />

<strong>in</strong>terpretation of the anaphor they <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g sentences:<br />

(25) a. Three fishermen sat by the river. They caught a lot of fish.<br />

b. At least three fishermen sat by the river. They caught a lot of fish.<br />

The first sentence <strong>in</strong> (25a) conta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the quantifier three fishermen is compatible with a<br />

situation <strong>in</strong> which more then three fishermen sat by the river, but they <strong>in</strong> the second sentence <strong>in</strong><br />

(25a) can only be understood as referr<strong>in</strong>g to the three fishermen <strong>in</strong> the preced<strong>in</strong>g sentence. The<br />

sentence <strong>in</strong> (25b) is also compatible with a situation <strong>in</strong> which more than three fishermen sat by<br />

the river, but <strong>in</strong> this case, the pronoun they <strong>in</strong> the second sentence refers to the totality of<br />

fishermen that sat by the river. In other words, <strong>in</strong> a situation where six fishermen sat by the<br />

river <strong>and</strong> three of them caught a lot of fish, (25a) would be true but (25b) would be false. The<br />

anaphor they serves as a means of dist<strong>in</strong>guish<strong>in</strong>g between the discourse referent created by the<br />

quantifier three fishermen <strong>and</strong> the quantifier at least three fishermen. In (25a), the anaphor<br />

refers back to one of the witnesses created by the quantifier, whereas <strong>in</strong> (25b) the anaphor<br />

cannot refer to any witness of the quantifier at least three fishermen, but must <strong>in</strong>stead refer to<br />

the maximal (exhaustive) <strong>in</strong>tersection of the set of fishermen with the set of entities sitt<strong>in</strong>g by<br />

the river. This dist<strong>in</strong>ction between exhaustivity <strong>and</strong> non-exhaustivity is accord<strong>in</strong>g to Endriss<br />

(2009) anchored <strong>in</strong> the lexical mean<strong>in</strong>g of the determ<strong>in</strong>ers. The dist<strong>in</strong>ction between the nonexhaustive<br />

weak determ<strong>in</strong>er three <strong>and</strong> the exhaustive monotone <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g determ<strong>in</strong>er at least<br />

three lies not only <strong>in</strong> the relation = versus ≥, respectively, but crucially <strong>in</strong> the way the plural<br />

discourse referent X is created: for three it is any subset of the <strong>in</strong>tersection of the noun P with<br />

the verb Q but for at least three it is the maximal <strong>in</strong>tersection between P <strong>and</strong> Q, as shown <strong>in</strong><br />

(26).<br />

(26) a. n = λPλQ.∃X[|X| = n ∧ X ⊆ P ∩ Q]<br />

b. at least n = λPλQ.∃X[|X| ≥ n ∧ X = P ∩ Q]<br />

Endriss (2009) uses this variable ability of quantifiers to create discourse referents for a<br />

classification of quantifiers <strong>in</strong> terms of their ability to be <strong>in</strong>terpreted as topics. Her ma<strong>in</strong> idea is<br />

that the aboutness function of a topic quantifier shouldn’t change the semantics (i.e. the truth<br />

conditions) of the sentence. So she tests whether quantifiers <strong>in</strong>terpreted as topics have the same<br />

mean<strong>in</strong>g as their basic mean<strong>in</strong>g. We refer the reader to the def<strong>in</strong>ition (6.1) on page 248 from<br />

Endriss (2009), where the exact mechanism is expla<strong>in</strong>ed. For our purposes, it is sufficient to<br />

demonstrate the topicality condition on two types of quantifiers: monotone decreas<strong>in</strong>g<br />

quantifiers (such as at most three horses <strong>in</strong> (27a)) <strong>and</strong> weak quantifiers (such as three horses <strong>in</strong><br />

(27b)). What the topicality condition tests is whether the topic <strong>in</strong>terpretation (via witness sets)<br />

equals the normal <strong>in</strong>terpretation of the quantifier. The topic <strong>in</strong>terpretation is on the left side of<br />

11<br />

For a different hypothesis accord<strong>in</strong>g to which only some quantifiers create discourse referents, see Kamp<br />

& Reyle 1993.<br />

121

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