Peace and Security Review, Vol.1 No. 2 - International Centre for ...

100 Peace and Security Review Vol.1, No.2, Second Quarter, 2008
Hijackings were the most popular tactic for many kinds of individuals.
Between 1967 and 2008 there were about 954 hijackings (a number that includes
those carried out for political and criminal purposes) out of around 1,123 total
incidents against airlines, that is 84 percent of the total. 11 190 of the hijackings
were conducted by terrorists. 12 There have been about twenty five 13 total
incidents against South Asian civil aviation since the first hijacking 1961, twenty
but the motivations for most remain unclear, thus providing an accurate
assessment of the political trends are difficult. Given the rapid development
of aviation in the region, and the volatile situation in several countries there
is a high probability that this situation could change rapidly.
The international civil aviation regime began to respond to the menace,
deploying the so-called X-ray machines, for example. That measure was only
partially effective as it foiled on average 19 percent of terrorist hijackings at
the time. 14 It did cause the terrorists to switch to other tactics.
Terrorists switched from hijackings to sabotage bombing, partially as a
result of increased security. Terrorists, during this phase were looking for the
drama of armed propaganda, while limiting the risk of casualties, but sabotage
bombing presented a greater risk for the terrorists because of the large numbers
of casualties created by such an attack, 15 but was still deployed frequently to
convey a message, usually retaliatory. The bombing of Pan Am flight 103 was
one such bombing; it was targeted in response to US raids on the Libyan military
and terrorist infrastructure. It was not intended to ‘instruct’ the public, no
official claim of responsibility was issued. The United States didn’t require a
claim of responsibility to know where responsibility lay. This attack also
illustrates the risks inherent in such operations. Because the aircraft exploded
over land, rather than the ocean as planned, it provided gruesome images
that enraged the public. Any intended message was drowned out by the grief
and cries for retaliation. The image of the nose section of the Boeing 747 resting
11 Ariel Merari, “Attacks on Civil Aviation: Trends and Lessons,” in Aviation Terrorism and Security,
(eds.) Paul Wilkinson and Brian Jenkins, p. 12. The statistics from 1997-2004 are augmented
with those from the FAA and Aviation Safety network. The numbers are estimates as neither
definitions of hijackings or reporting of them are standard.
12 Ibid., p. 13 and above note.
13 The author looks at only incidents that either originate in the region or are targeting carriers
from the region. Additionally hoax bomb threats and attacks on airline offices are not included,
the former appears to be a favorite of delayed passengers in recent years.
14 Ibid., p. 20 and above note.
15 For an excellent debate on the subject of when and why to claim credit for attacks see “Terrorism
and Claiming Credit: The Debate” in Terrorism and Political Violence 9:1 Spring, 1997, pp. 1-19.
Vol.1, No.2 2008 pp.95-114