Peace and Security Review, Vol.1 No. 2 - International Centre for ...

74 Peace and Security Review Vol.1, No.2, Second Quarter, 2008
so they will be seen as protectors, rather than police for other parts of
the country that will always be considered occupiers.
• To enlist the support of the population, the Philippine government
and the Regional government in the autonomous region should jointly
strive to create an environment where the Moros can live with security,
stability and dignity. For its part, the central government should make
every effort to build a national consensus to grant a genuine autonomy
to Bangsamoro people. The Philippine government should consider
compensation of those displaced by the Christian settlers if only to
prevent further animosity for the settler Christians and the native
Muslims.
• The Philippine government should ensure that the Autonomous region
will have the rule of law. It should make the Autonomous government
accountable for its actions and corruption must not be left unpunished.
• There are four stakeholders that evolved through decades of conflict
in the Moro areas: the traditional leaders (datu/sultan), the MNLF,
the MILF and the Christian settler’s leaders. There must be a political
dialogue, consultation and consensus among these leaders in order to
achieve peace.
• On the diplomatic front, United States should consider being involved
in the peace process by either complementing the efforts of the
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) or by itself should
make proactive efforts to reach out a just and acceptable political
settlement.
V. CONCLUSION
“In the absence of a comprehensive national plan, the individual application
of selected tactics and policies can prolong a conflict or even result in outright
failure,” conclude Hoffman and Morrison-taw. 65 This observation aptly sums
up the Philippine approach in the Bangsamoro Southern Philippines. The
government’s sustained emphasis on military measures without the corresponding
socio-economic initiatives and political strategic objective has
prolonged the conflict. Incoherent and inconsistent government policies have
negated the impact of several positive initiatives taken in the campaign. The
Tripoli agreement of 1976 and 1996 Peace Agreement were lost Philippine
government opportunities to end the conflict.
65 Ibid.
Vol.1, No.2 2008 pp.49-76