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70 Peace and Security Review Vol.1, No.2, Second Quarter, 2008 Foreign Collaboration If there is strength of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), it is its ability to acquire foreign support in both its military approach and non-military measures, including collaboration in dealing with the Bangsamoro Secessionist Movement. The 57-nation Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), Libya, Indonesia, Malaysia ⎯ all OIC member countries, and United States, Australia and United Kingdom are among the countries that directly supporting and providing resources to the GRP to resolve the Moro problem peacefully. Peace Process In 1976 the Marcos administration took the opportunity to resolve the Moro problem, when it had convinced Libya, and later the OIC to mediate the conflict while maintaining the territorial integrity of the Philippines. Instead of implementing the Tripoli Agreement in 1976, Marcos was accused by the MNLF of deceit by hiding under the cloak of Philippine Constitution by conducting plebiscite, invoking the constitutional provision of democratic process. Marcos not only rejected the concern of the MNLF but unilaterally implemented his own form of autonomy by creating two autonomous regions ⎯ Regions 9 and 12. Marcos might have succeeded militarily by dividing the ranks of the MNLF but failed to arrive at a just and acceptable political settlement. The Marcos administration wanted to win a war, not the peace, as some pundits explained later. Another successful effort of which the GRP worked hard and lost is the 1996 Peace agreement mediated by Indonesia. This was a case of a diplomatic coup on the part of the Philippines when it had inked a peace deal accepted by the MNLF. To this day, the MNLF has three factions ⎯ the MNLF under Misuari currently waging a war against the government, the MNLF Council of 15 composed of MNLF senior Commanders who have accepted positions in the government, and the Abu Sayaf group. Politically the GRP had again succeeded in dividing the MNLF ranks, but it seems to have not learnt lessons from the experience of the Marcos Martial law administration. The government wasted time and money letting a peace process fade through lack of support to the MNLF government in the autonomous region. Among the most successful collaborations is the Malaysia’s mediated peace process between the GRP and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, which lead to a cessation of hostilities being monitored by a Malaysia led International Monitoring Team (IMT). Participating countries in the IMT includes teams from Brunei, Libya, Japan and Canada. This monitoring team Vol.1, No.2 2008 pp.49-76
Taharudin Ampatuan Philippines’ Counter Insurgency and Terrorism 71 reduced the number of military engagements between the MILF and he GRP by 98 percent. The IMT has also effectively prevented even the tribal and clan conflict in the Muslim communities. Global War on Terror In 2003 the United States designated the Philippines as a major non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally. The total U.S. military assistance from 2001 to 2005 was US$316 million, which made the Philippines the fourth largest recipient of US foreign military assistance. 61 This support is over and above the support provided by US through the USAID programs. US also shifted its traditional military exercises from Luzon to Mindanao with the Balikatan Exercises re-directed in Sulu and Basilan since 2002. The US Operations are part of US CT Campaign in Asia-Pacific aptly called “Operation Enduring Freedom.” The US, aside from enhancing the capability of the Philippine Armed Forces in Counter terrorism through provision of training and equipment, has also actively pursued humanitarian operations to “win the hearts and minds of the Muslim communities.” US Support 2001, USD38 2005,USD164 , 2003,USD144 Figure 3: US Fund Support (million $) After the United States, Australia is the second largest foreign provider of training to the Philippine military. The Philippines and Australia signed two MoUs for CT and Trans-national crime in 2003, during Australian Prime Minister John Howard’s visit to the Philippines. Australia pledged a threeyear, A$5 million package for counter-terrorism assistance, which was doubled in October 2004 to A$10 million over a five-year period. 62 A Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) is currently pending in the Philippine senate, which will allow Australian troops on the Philippine soil. 61 Philippines Profile 2006: Security, accessed http://fatatlas.com/node/1000004170. 62 Cesar Ben Basan Baroña, “Australia Steps Up Military Aid to Philippines,” Bulatlat.com, 2004. Vol.1, No.2 2008 pp.49-76
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