Peace and Security Review, Vol.1 No. 2 - International Centre for ...

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62 Peace and Security Review Vol.1, No.2, Second Quarter, 2008 Code 39 that provides authority for the Local Government Unit (LGU) Officials’ supervision over police in their localities. 40 Hence, a Chief of police of town, city or a police provincial director has two masters: the Mayor or the provincial governor and the nationalize police hierarchy which is part of central government. As Hoffman and Taw explain, although the dependence of the police on security forces ⎯ including the army in combating insurgency cannot be denied, the police should play a major role in maintaining internal security. 41 This was the British experience in dealing with the deteriorating situation in Northern Ireland in 1972. The deployment of the army clothed with special powers of surveillance, head check, arrest, search and seizure, while bringing impressive gains in material terms made little headway in winning the support and cooperation of the population. 42 The situation improved only when British replaced the senior army officer who was in charge of the overall direction of security operations with a chief constable; strengthened and reorganized the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC); and halved the number of troops deployed in the operations. 43 In the Philippine experience, this was not the case ⎯ but the experience suggest that there should be a correct overlap of military and police functions, and a clear framework of “Military primary role-police support role or vice versa.” An example would be insurgent groups that claim large military formations and territorial influence requires bigger security force presence than the police can normally provide. Additionally police are often at greater risk than the military, as policemen are most often members of the community they serve, unlike the Army who is rotated into the area. Another factor is to remember the nature of the insurgency. It is a socio-political conflict where some portion of the population may share the objectives, and may even support the methods of the insurgents. This may include the police as well. Finally, although the police are loyal, and can be protected, they are simply not equipped or trained to fight insurgents. The police are oriented towards crime fighting, where force is the last resort. While the police role is indispensable in counter insurgency and counter terrorism, there is a need to determine the right operational condition wherein the police take a primary 39 Republic Act 7260, “The Local Government Code.” 40 Republic Act 6795, “Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1998.” 41 Ibid., p. 78. 42 Chaman Lal, “Terrorism and Insuregency,” available at: http://wwww.punjabbilok.com/ terrorism/10.htm. 43 Ibid., p22. Vol.1, No.2 2008 pp.49-76
Taharudin Ampatuan Philippines’ Counter Insurgency and Terrorism 63 role or supporting role. As experienced, military can be trained as community organizers and perform limited law enforcement role. One should not forget that a counter insurgency campaign is an internal security operations ⎯ a socio-economic and political conflict. One should not see military involve in counterinsurgency as the one conventionally portrayed in the movies as seize and destroy individuals because in insurgency situation he is an organizer, social worker and the representative of the government rolled into one. In an effort to address the lack of unity of command, and to recognize the nature of the conflict, the government upgraded the counter insurgency to a cabinet level activity, removing it from the sole authority of the Defense department. This allowed the national development agencies to synchronize and integrate its programs with the overall national security establishment. The idea is to pen a whole-of-government approach, which requires the whole mechanisms of government in addressing the insurgency for both the communist and secessionist movement or terrorism. A National Internal Security Plan (NISP) was also crafted that outlines and defines agencies responsibilities. 44 The NISP contains a comprehensive plan to address the communist insurgency but not the Bangsamoro secessionist movement. NISP identified the critical question as a socio-economic land reform issue that confused the objectives of the communist insurgency with the political demand of the Moros for self determination (autonomy). Hence, the plan could not be implemented in the Moro areas, except for the military component. Another flaw was the attempt to establish an Area Coordination Center (ACC) in every province, especially in the Muslim provinces. It was a noble attempt of the central government to synchronize programs, but it failed because the framework runs counter to the decentralization policy which is constitutionally mandated and under the Local Government Code. The government should have initiated a legislated policy that combines all councils from local to strategic level, rather than creating a structure that only undermines existing institutional mechanisms in placed. The whole idea of whole-of government approach is novel but it must be tailored to the existing structure. Instead of duplication and redundancy, it must strengthened existing structure or provide mechanisms for convergence and collaboration. For instance, instead of creating an area coordinating centre, the Peace and Order Council should have been strengthened and since the Local Executive has power as chairman of all local boards and councils, a comprehensive plan should have integrated the basic function of public 44 Executive Order No. 21 (19 June 2001), “Creating a Coordinative and Integrative System on Internal Security.” Vol.1, No.2 2008 pp.49-76
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