Peace and Security Review, Vol.1 No. 2 - International Centre for ...

Taharudin Ampatuan Philippines’ Counter Insurgency and Terrorism 73
intelligence coordinative structure but too many un-synchronized intelligence
collection efforts, as in the case of NICA, which should supposedly coordinate
intelligence at strategic level, but rather it is operational and at the tactical
level. This led to security forces without sufficient actionable intelligence or
burn-out intelligence operations. To its credit though, the government has
been reasonably effective in enlisting the assistance and cooperation of other
governments and foreign-security agencies in the campaign.
Based on the detailed assessment and analysis of the Philippine counterinsurgency
and counter terrorism strategy, the paper has following recommendations:
• At policy level, the problem of synchronizing the disaster management
and crisis response with two major agencies of government (DND
and DILG) involved, suggest a legislative initiative to harmonize their
structure and allow for seamless overlap and identification of specific
agencies’ functions.
• The military and police coordination is integral to the success of the
campaign. The Philippine experience suggests that there must be a
mechanisms in place at all levels of command that would identify the
principal-support relationship role for the military and police. While
Philippine military personnel, both officers and enlisted, have since
1987 been trained in community organizing and disaster and rehabilitation
management. This and their extensive efforts in nation building,
must not implement as stand alone efforts, but as part of both local
government and national government agencies, so that all are involved
in these critical operations.
• The socio-economic and political dimension of counter-insurgency
and counter terrorism suggest an inter-agency effort at all levels of
command from local to strategic level, which suggest a whole-of -
government approach. This can be achieved by strengthening the
pillars of the criminal justice system. It must also allow participation
of private sector and civil society in the affairs of government by
improving transparency in governance.
• The wisdom of the peace agreement in creating an ARMM regional
command led by Moros both in the police and military must be
implemented to reinforce government rhetoric of giving the Moros
self governance with actionable program.
• Mobilizing and increasing the capability of local police of Moro territories
through training. This must be coupled with the provision to adequately
arm locals who are familiar with the customs and traditions
Vol.1, No.2 2008 pp.49-76