Peace and Security Review, Vol.1 No. 2 - International Centre for ...

Badrul A. Khan South Asia and Regionalism 89
the US, “gets commitments by secondary states to participate within the hegemonic
order” (Ikenberry, 1999: 124) and it seems that such commitment has
been agreed upon by India and the US during the brief yet meaningful partnership
that both states have been able to build. Because of liberal commonality
that both the countries have, the fear of being dominated by the US appears
to be of lesser concern to India, as the enforcement of compliance over India
by the US equally looks more and more meaningless. Hence, democratisation
in the South Asian region has been the new shibboleth employed by the USA,
which include countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan.
However, as the backwater of global politics such a move will make
South Asia the site of a “great game” involving not just the USA and China
but also, the smaller nations of the region. India’s strategic partnership with
the USA as stated by Manmohan Singh is “based both on principle as well as
pragmatism” (Batra: 2006) and intended to serve partially India’s strategic
interest in relation to China. The rationale in this instance is clear. Indo-
China relationship permeates rivalry and involvement of the USA will also
drag other countries into this geo-political equation. Being close to the region,
China is India’s economic rival, however overcoming its formidable challenge
that overshadows as much as it jeopardizes India’s strategic interest, has
proved to be a stupendous task. With a population of 1.28 billion and an
impressive growth rate of 9%, China outsmarts India by a great margin.
Compared to India’s 406 million, China’s labour force is 706 million and is
free from trade unionization, one that tend to keep China immune from any
major labour unrest. Foreign investment, a key to measuring economic success,
has found in China a safer destination despite its authoritarian structure of
power, which although incompatible with the democratic set-up that India
has, has hardly been any obstacle to the massive multinational investment,
which China is able to draw (44 billion a year compared to India’s 3.4 billion
a year). Besides trade and investment it is indicative that China has developed a
better infrastructure, which now provides 247 for every 1000 people with
fixed telephone and mobiles lines compared to India’s 44 (Business Week
Online, 2005). To international business community China appears to be less
bureaucratic compared to India where red tape and poor infrastructure
hamstring business incentives.
By this, India may be viewed as a client state, a dependent power unable
to act on its own. And although India-USA alliance may benefit India by
creating for her a condition of relative autonomy, it will affect the greater
issue of regionalism in earnest. After all, global security appears to be more
‘the sum of its regional parts rather than as a product of global logic’ (Ayoob,
1999, p. 118) and South Asian countries need more leverage in the decision
Vol.1, No.2 2008 pp.77-93