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64 Peace and Security Review Vol.1, No.2, Second Quarter, 2008 safety, development and disaster management in a local counter-insurgency plan. The local police status needs to be clarified; they cannot have two masters and expect them to perform efficiently. If there is a need to amend the law, it must be amended. Effective Anti-Terrorist Legislations Combined with Confidence Building Measures History shows that successful counter-insurgency campaigns acknowledge that the people are the centre of gravity in insurgency warfare, and that the key to winning strategy lies in enlisting the help of the inhabitants. When the government effectively meets its people’s political and socio-economic needs, insurgency has a less fertile breeding environment. In Northern Ireland, for instance, where trouble erupted in 1969 because of decades of discrimination against the Catholics over jobs, housing, education, the British government shifted the emphasis from defeating terrorism by force to providing political concessions to the Catholic minority, ensuring fair employment and job availability through anti-discrimination legislation, and redressing genuine grievances about the allocation of public housing, the provision of social services, etc. 45 Britain actively pursued measures aimed at improving relations between the community and security forces, and between the community and the government. 46 In Bangsamoro Southern Philippines there has been a long history of using a mix of force and policies to address development. It was the Estrada administration (2000) who had shown total disregard for confidence building in its all-out war policy against the MILF. It did not only force the death of a peace agreement signed by the government in 1996, but also renewed resentment and hostilities with the Muslim population. Not only did it show insensitivity to religious symbols, by allowing soldier to post a Philippine flag on a Minaret of a bombed mosque, but the President himself feasted on pork with soldiers inside a captured Mosque. 47 This law (Martial Law) and acts remind that of Britain’s anti-terrorist legislations in 1983, Lord Jellicoe’s pertinent observation that the measures that were most likely to violate civil liberties were also the least valuable. 48 It also holds especially in Southern 45 Hoffman and Morrison Taw, p. 56. 46 Ibid. 47 Minda News, accessed 30 March 2008, http://www.mindanews.com/index.php?option=com_ content&task=view&id=382&Itemid=70. 48 Andrew Blick and Stuart Weir: “The riles of the game: Terrorism Bill 2005,” http://www.jrrt.org. uk/rules_of_the _Game_leaflet.pdf. Vol.1, No.2 2008 pp.49-76
Taharudin Ampatuan Philippines’ Counter Insurgency and Terrorism 65 Philippines context, where repressive state policies and laws have proved counter-productive. This realization seems to reflect the approach taken by the government of President Aquino (1987-1992), which negotiated for peace with the MNLF and ensured that in the 1987 Philippine Constitution 49 provides for the creation of the Muslim Mindanao Autonomous region. This was sustained by the Ramos administration (1992-1998) that concluded a peace deal with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) with the signing of the GRP-MNLF 1996 peace agreement and the passage of the autonomy law. The administration of President Arroyo (2004) is currently negotiating with the MILF and has a successful cessation of hostilities agreement through the help of foreign military monitoring team led by Malaysia. It has also recently passed an Antiterrorism law. 50 The Human Security Act (RA 9372) reflects the government resolve to address the threat of terrorism but also ensures accountability for law enforcers to avoid excesses in implementing the law. Even the Philippine Armed Forces have developed a civil-military relations strategy (Salaam ⎯ Special Advocacy for the livelihood assistance for the advancement of Muslim). 51 This campaign strategy to win the hearts and minds of the Muslim population not only establish mechanisms for convergence of efforts of peace initiatives and development efforts between the security component of government (Army) and the national development agencies, but also a face-to-face information operations that encourages the Muslims to develop and understand Islamic values, distorted by the rebels. This strategy brought with it the US Army’s humanitarian efforts in Muslim communities. For most Muslims in Southern Philippines ⎯ psychologically and emotionally scarred by pervasive violence ⎯ these “healing touches” are either too little or too late or both. While there are serious efforts to address the Moro problem at the strategic level and has had a favourable policy environment, the Philippine government has mostly failed in implementation of policies and programs. In the ten years since the implementation of the 1996 peace accord, the people of the autonomous region are worse off than before. This can be attributed to the lack of political will from the government. In addition, corruption and public accountability, economic mismanagement, and peace and order problem are the major issues related to the failure of governance in Southern Philippines. 49 Sec 15, Art X, (Autonomous Region) 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. 50 Republic Act no. 9372, “Human Security Act of 2007.” 51 Ampatuan, 2002. Vol.1, No.2 2008 pp.49-76
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