Peace and Security Review, Vol.1 No. 2 - International Centre for ...

60 Peace and Security Review Vol.1, No.2, Second Quarter, 2008
transferred to augment 4 th Infantry Division. All three divisions were placed
under the Operational Command of the CEMCOM. 34 These three Divisions
did not defeat the MNLF, but it provided sufficient time for the government to
organize a unified response. Part of the effort was to consolidate the organizational
ease provided by the declaration of Martial Law on September 11,
1971. This provided the Marcos government the ability to place development
agencies directly supporting military campaigns under a central command.
One tangible offshoot of this policy was a massive reconstruction program,
dubbed the “Reconstruction and Development Program in Muslim Mindanao”
that provided an inter-agency coordinative framework for development
initiatives. 35 Marcos has not only succeeded in luring the MNLF through its
Chairman Nur Misuari to sign a peace agreement 36 in 1976 at Tripoli Libya,
but also succeeded in taking advantage of the internal rift between the traditional
leaders and the MNLF Moro progressive leaders led by Nur Misuari to
rift animosity.
Marcos like the US, used the Datus and their influence in both the military
and non-military campaigns to assist the Philippine government. The Philippine
government introduce the Barangay Self-Defense Unit (BSDU), a community
based para-military forces that allowed the armed supporters of the Datus
(traditional leaders) to legally acquire firearms and defend their communities.
In the political front, Marcos implemented his own interpretation of the
Tripoli agreement in 1976, and unilaterally established two autonomous
region in Mindanao ⎯ Region 9 and 12. This policy was complemented by a
massive infrastructure development, such as roads, schools and scholarship
for Muslims.
Marcos used the Martial Law regime to make the Philippine Constabulary
and the Integrated National Police as a fourth major service command of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), alongside the Army, Navy and Air
force. To further establish a unified command structure, Marcos created the
Armed Forces of the Philippines Southern Command which created a unified
command structure for the whole Mindanao Island. Marcos had the opportunity
to defeat the insurgency, but failed to deliver on the promised political
and development issues. Some suggests that temporary success of divide
and rule will finally calmed the secessionist movement. Instead, he further
34 Ampatuan, 2002.
35 Presidential Task Force on the Reconstruction and Development of Muslim Mindanao, Vol. 1,
1973, pp. i-iii.
36 “The Tripoli Agreement,” MNLF Website, accessed on 25 February 2008, http://mnlf.net/
The_Tripoli.htm.
Vol.1, No.2 2008 pp.49-76