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58 Peace and Security Review Vol.1, No.2, Second Quarter, 2008 British government had the “will to settle” the Northern Ireland Conflict, which meant that “neither Labor nor the Conservatives exploited the issue for partisan gains.” 26 In the case of the Philippine government the peace agreements entered into by the government was hijacked in congress through majority Christian Philippine Congress, and watered down. While the MNLF participated and governed the Autonomous Region created for the purpose, in 2003 the MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari withdrew from the Peace Agreement, accusing the government of deceit and lack of commitment to the peace accord, and orchestrating the split in the MNLF leadership, and privy to the creation of pro-government, Council of 15-MNLF faction. This development not only wasted the peace process but only strengthened the negative perceptions of the Moros about the Philippine government sincerity and commitment in resolving the issue peacefully. The Philippine government counter-terrorism campaign has suffered because of flawed metrics. Instead of addressing the problem, it accused the MNLF of inefficiency and charged Nur Misuari of graft and corruption, over and above the charges of rebellion it brought against him. In other words, the process of analysis at the higher level appears to be emanating from political considerations rather than any objective approach. One of the things that allowed Great Britain to attain success in Malaya, according to John Nagl, was its willingness at all times to admit failure. 27 A winning counterinsurgency strategy requires an independent strategic assessment from time to time, and those whose careers are contingent on the success of a campaign can never evaluate it will brutal objectivity. 28 Using Hoffman and Taw basic elements of successful counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism, this paper will examine the Philippine counter insurgency and counter terrorism campaign in the Bangsamoro Southern Philippines. Unified Command and Control Structure Hoffman and Taw (1992) suggest unity of command, as one of the key elements in an effective counter-insurgency and counter terrorism. 29 The argument posed is that an absence of such a structure leads to diffusion of authority and 26 A.G. Noorani, “Irish Lessons for Kashmir,” Frontline, Volume 20, Issue 7, March 29-April 2003. 27 John Nagl, “Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife,” (West Port: Praeger, 2002), p. 192. 28 Steven Metz and Raymod Millen, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21 st Century; Reconceptualizing Threat and Response,” Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, November 2004. 29 Hoffman and Taw: p. v. Vol.1, No.2 2008 pp.49-76
Taharudin Ampatuan Philippines’ Counter Insurgency and Terrorism 59 competition among security forces, inadequate collection and poor dissemination of intelligence, a dangerously stultifying bureaucracy, and inefficient tactical operations. The history of counter-insurgency warfare shows that the full integration of all government agencies under unified control (and preferably unified command) is the only way to synchronize the elements of power. Unified command and control structure is considered one of the prime reasons for the British success in Malaya. The British did not start off this way in Malaya, during the first three years of the emergency, the British army had alienated vast majority of the population with large military sweeps, and indiscriminate destruction and killings. 30 The primary reason Nagl argues of the lack of the Army’s direction is disunity of command: the police commissioner was nominally, but not actually, in command of all forces, and there was no overall integration of civil-military efforts. 31 A successful implementation of Malayan Counter insurgency plan in 1952, however, effectively solved the problems of bureaucratic rivalries, disconnects, and infighting in Malaya, thereby permitting effective coordination of the civil administration, the military and the police; the coordination of intelligence; and, most critically, the flexibility to respond quickly, often with novel policies and tactics, to the problem at hand. 32 Marcos Martial Law Military (hard) Approach As mentioned in part 2, the 1968 Jabidah massacre and Malaysia’s support initiated the open hostility between the Philippine government and the Moros that caught the Philippine government by surprise. It was basically for the first three years from 1971 to 1973 that the Marcos government response was totally uncoordinated. With only the 4 th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army stationed in Mindanao defending the area for three years until 1973, the MNLF captured significant areas in Mindanao. The Philippine government was able to regain momentum in 1973 when it hastily established the Central Mindanao Command (CEMCOM) to organize a campaign against the secessionists in Central Mindanao. 33 With this development, two Divisions of the Philippine Army from Luzon (Northern Philippines), the 1 st Infantry Division and the 3 rd Infantry Division were 30 Nagl, p. 195. 31 Ibid. 32 Bruce Hoffman, “Insurgency and Counter-insurgency in Iraq,” occasional paper, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, 2004, p. 7. 33 Abat, Fortunato U, “The Day we nearly lost Mindanao: The CEMCOM Story,” (Quezon City, Philippines: SBA Printers Inc, 1984), p. 36. Vol.1, No.2 2008 pp.49-76
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