Peace and Security Review, Vol.1 No. 2 - International Centre for ...
Peace and Security Review, Vol.1 No. 2 - International Centre for ...
Peace and Security Review, Vol.1 No. 2 - International Centre for ...
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54 <strong>Peace</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Security</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>Vol.1</strong>, <strong>No</strong>.2, Second Quarter, 2008<br />
supporters. This split was significant, as it set the stage <strong>for</strong> a lasting distrust<br />
among the Moro leadership that still remains to this day.<br />
The MNLF-MILF Intramurals<br />
Despite the earlier factions, the influence of Islam was not entirely affected<br />
by the rivalry <strong>and</strong> division, but instead eases its way within the movement.<br />
In fact the subsequent cracked of disunity in the Moro rebellion was led by<br />
the clergies, this time by Hashim Salamat. A Maguindanao-Maranao tribe, led<br />
faction of the MNLF, accused Misuari <strong>for</strong> betrayal <strong>and</strong> nepotism due to his<br />
preferential treatment of Tausug in MNLF key appointments. Among others,<br />
Misuari’s lack of consultation in agreeing to the pressure of Libya <strong>and</strong> the<br />
Organization of the Islamic Conference to accept an autonomy solution to<br />
the Moro problem was highly resented. This faction was <strong>for</strong>mally organized<br />
in 1984, which called itself the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) to emphasize<br />
its being Islamic movement. 14 Offered a suitable base by the Jemaati Islamiyah<br />
<strong>and</strong> taking advantage of the opportunity offered by the Soviet invasion of<br />
Afghanistan, Ustadz Hashim Salamat relocated his base from Saudi Arabia<br />
to Pakistan. 15 Significant to the <strong>for</strong>ming of the MILF was the manifest<br />
strength of Islamist influence to the Moro rebellion. This cracked to the unity<br />
of Moro stakeholders created an open competition <strong>for</strong> supremacy in the<br />
Moro Muslim communities, among the traditional <strong>and</strong> political leaders, who<br />
control the local politics with armed followers; the religious leaders mostly<br />
leading the MILF, <strong>and</strong> the MNLF Nationalist identified with Misuari.<br />
Third Wave of Islam: Radical Islam <strong>and</strong> the Afghanistan Network 16<br />
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan <strong>and</strong> the oil boom in the Middle East in<br />
the 70’s provided a catalyst <strong>for</strong> resurgent <strong>and</strong> the trans-nationalization of<br />
Islamist movements in the Middle East to the rest of the Muslim world.<br />
Firstly, in the case of Afghanistan, the participation of Saudi <strong>and</strong> Pakistan<br />
aided influx of international Mujahideens from Middle East <strong>and</strong> Southeast<br />
Asia to name a few, to drive the Soviet Union. Its significant implication is<br />
the building of international networks that catalyses the trans-nationalization<br />
of Afghan type Jihad movement that co-opted most ethno-Islamist liberation<br />
movements. Secondly, the oil boom of the 70’s also attracted Muslim all over<br />
14 Krisna Gaerlan <strong>and</strong> Mara Stankovitch (eds), “Rebels Warlords <strong>and</strong> Ulama: A Reader on Muslim<br />
Separatism <strong>and</strong> the War in Southern Philippines,” (Quezon City: Institute of Popular Democracy,<br />
1999) pp. 152-58.<br />
15 Ustadz Hashim Salamat profile, ICPVTR, 2008.<br />
16 Please refer to Appendix 1: MILF profile <strong>for</strong> detail.<br />
<strong>Vol.1</strong>, <strong>No</strong>.2 2008 pp.49-76