Peace and Security Review, Vol.1 No. 2 - International Centre for ...

Taharudin Ampatuan Philippines’ Counter Insurgency and Terrorism 63
role or supporting role. As experienced, military can be trained as community
organizers and perform limited law enforcement role. One should not forget
that a counter insurgency campaign is an internal security operations ⎯ a
socio-economic and political conflict. One should not see military involve in
counterinsurgency as the one conventionally portrayed in the movies as seize
and destroy individuals because in insurgency situation he is an organizer,
social worker and the representative of the government rolled into one.
In an effort to address the lack of unity of command, and to recognize
the nature of the conflict, the government upgraded the counter insurgency
to a cabinet level activity, removing it from the sole authority of the Defense
department. This allowed the national development agencies to synchronize
and integrate its programs with the overall national security establishment.
The idea is to pen a whole-of-government approach, which requires the whole
mechanisms of government in addressing the insurgency for both the communist
and secessionist movement or terrorism. A National Internal Security
Plan (NISP) was also crafted that outlines and defines agencies responsibilities. 44
The NISP contains a comprehensive plan to address the communist insurgency
but not the Bangsamoro secessionist movement. NISP identified the critical
question as a socio-economic land reform issue that confused the objectives
of the communist insurgency with the political demand of the Moros for self
determination (autonomy). Hence, the plan could not be implemented in the
Moro areas, except for the military component.
Another flaw was the attempt to establish an Area Coordination Center
(ACC) in every province, especially in the Muslim provinces. It was a noble
attempt of the central government to synchronize programs, but it failed
because the framework runs counter to the decentralization policy which is
constitutionally mandated and under the Local Government Code. The government
should have initiated a legislated policy that combines all councils
from local to strategic level, rather than creating a structure that only undermines
existing institutional mechanisms in placed.
The whole idea of whole-of government approach is novel but it must
be tailored to the existing structure. Instead of duplication and redundancy, it
must strengthened existing structure or provide mechanisms for convergence
and collaboration. For instance, instead of creating an area coordinating centre,
the Peace and Order Council should have been strengthened and since the
Local Executive has power as chairman of all local boards and councils, a
comprehensive plan should have integrated the basic function of public
44 Executive Order No. 21 (19 June 2001), “Creating a Coordinative and Integrative System on
Internal Security.”
Vol.1, No.2 2008 pp.49-76