Peace and Security Review, Vol.1 No. 2 - International Centre for ...

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72 Peace and Security Review Vol.1, No.2, Second Quarter, 2008 While the assistance of the United States created a favourable environment for support for the AFP to neutralized top Abu Sayaf group leaders, this is temporary, without the just and acceptable political settlement. In a larger context, it is just like “ping-pong ball” because not only did the Misuari led group of the MNLF renew their hostility against the government, threatening to undermine the gains of US-Philippines collaboration in Counter terrorism, but chances are not remote that a tactical alliance or unification maybe possible between the MNLF and the ASG and worst of maybe the MILF if the peace process breaks down. Security experts saw that since US has formed a significant influence to the problem and its close relationship with the Philippine government, it should instead of just strengthening the military capability of the GRP that may only create more violence than peace; it must actively get involved in reaching a just and acceptable political solution to the problem. A delay in the peace process is only giving the hardliners in the MILF grounds and support, Al Haj Murad Ibrahim 63 have said after the peace process hit a snag. No one wants a situation that resembles that of Afghanistan or Palestine. Intelligence and Border Security Arrangements The Philippines has also created several multilateral border security arrangements with Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei that provides joint patrols between and among the member countries. From 2003, after the Malaysia Sipadan resorts abductions, there was no reported incident of terrorist activities in the region. Other countries that have foreign intelligence exchanges with the Philippines include Singapore, Saudi Arabia and recently Pakistan. 64 IV. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS As discussed in part three, the Philippines response to the four vital counterinsurgency elements leaves much to be desired. The present unified command and coordination structure in the Moro territories is largely ineffective, which in turn has led to a great deal of confusion, competition among security forces and intelligence agencies deployed in operations. The issue is not the absence of coordination, but too many coordinative structures and doctrines. The government has also failed to effectively meet the political and socio-economic needs of the Bangsamoro people, and has been unable to win their support in the struggle. On intelligence, the Philippine case showed not wanting on 63 www.luwaran.com. 64 NICA Briefing, 12 December 2005 at the Anti-Terrorism Task Force (ATTF), NSC. Vol.1, No.2 2008 pp.49-76
Taharudin Ampatuan Philippines’ Counter Insurgency and Terrorism 73 intelligence coordinative structure but too many un-synchronized intelligence collection efforts, as in the case of NICA, which should supposedly coordinate intelligence at strategic level, but rather it is operational and at the tactical level. This led to security forces without sufficient actionable intelligence or burn-out intelligence operations. To its credit though, the government has been reasonably effective in enlisting the assistance and cooperation of other governments and foreign-security agencies in the campaign. Based on the detailed assessment and analysis of the Philippine counterinsurgency and counter terrorism strategy, the paper has following recommendations: • At policy level, the problem of synchronizing the disaster management and crisis response with two major agencies of government (DND and DILG) involved, suggest a legislative initiative to harmonize their structure and allow for seamless overlap and identification of specific agencies’ functions. • The military and police coordination is integral to the success of the campaign. The Philippine experience suggests that there must be a mechanisms in place at all levels of command that would identify the principal-support relationship role for the military and police. While Philippine military personnel, both officers and enlisted, have since 1987 been trained in community organizing and disaster and rehabilitation management. This and their extensive efforts in nation building, must not implement as stand alone efforts, but as part of both local government and national government agencies, so that all are involved in these critical operations. • The socio-economic and political dimension of counter-insurgency and counter terrorism suggest an inter-agency effort at all levels of command from local to strategic level, which suggest a whole-of - government approach. This can be achieved by strengthening the pillars of the criminal justice system. It must also allow participation of private sector and civil society in the affairs of government by improving transparency in governance. • The wisdom of the peace agreement in creating an ARMM regional command led by Moros both in the police and military must be implemented to reinforce government rhetoric of giving the Moros self governance with actionable program. • Mobilizing and increasing the capability of local police of Moro territories through training. This must be coupled with the provision to adequately arm locals who are familiar with the customs and traditions Vol.1, No.2 2008 pp.49-76
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