Peace and Security Review, Vol.1 No. 2 - International Centre for ...
Peace and Security Review, Vol.1 No. 2 - International Centre for ...
Peace and Security Review, Vol.1 No. 2 - International Centre for ...
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110 <strong>Peace</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Security</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>Vol.1</strong>, <strong>No</strong>.2, Second Quarter, 2008<br />
The second level of analysis on terrorism is the operational level. This<br />
refers to both the organized groups, such as Al-Qaeda, Hamas, JI <strong>and</strong> others,<br />
but also the response to these groups. The response community is doing exceptionally<br />
well in this area. Organized groups are finding there operational<br />
environment heavily restricted. The aviation environment has had some<br />
equal success. Through a commitment to a multi-layered through such step<br />
as increase access control, air marshals, <strong>and</strong> locked cockpit doors are positive<br />
basic steps. But the international community needs to take a more active role<br />
in the critical area of st<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>and</strong> in<strong>for</strong>mation sharing.<br />
Operational<br />
• <strong>International</strong> Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) needs to establish<br />
basic st<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>for</strong> such items as cargo screening, document security<br />
<strong>and</strong> other in-flight issues.<br />
• The ICAO needs to have en<strong>for</strong>cement power, which can <strong>and</strong> should<br />
include economic incentives <strong>for</strong> meeting required st<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>and</strong> recommended<br />
practices.<br />
• The ICAO <strong>and</strong> <strong>International</strong> Air Transport Association (IATA) should<br />
establish Joint Systems Integration Comm<strong>and</strong> (JSIC).<br />
The international community is attempting to address the first issue, but<br />
there are powerful domestic <strong>for</strong>ces at are hindering these ef<strong>for</strong>ts. There are,<br />
<strong>for</strong> example, technology requirements <strong>for</strong> screening systems that are designed<br />
not to enhance security, but to protect domestic manufactures <strong>for</strong> competition.<br />
This is underst<strong>and</strong>able but not acceptable. ICAO member states can currently<br />
opt out of security requirements by simply in<strong>for</strong>ming the ICAO that it is<br />
doing it, but it is not required to disclose which or how many requirements it<br />
is not following, how long it intends to be out of compliance, <strong>and</strong> if it has any<br />
intentions to regain its <strong>for</strong>mer status.<br />
One way to provide en<strong>for</strong>cement is to work with the insurance industry<br />
to have adjustable rates <strong>for</strong> carriers <strong>and</strong> airports who are in various levels of<br />
compliance. One can look at other funding areas such as infrastructure bonds<br />
as well.<br />
As mentioned through out this paper, the best way to defeat an asymmetric<br />
opponent is through in<strong>for</strong>mation sharing. The international aviation<br />
community can provide an example through merging the ef<strong>for</strong>ts of the ICAO<br />
<strong>and</strong> IATA in creating a Joint <strong>Security</strong> <strong>and</strong> Intelligence Center. This can<br />
leverage the laudable security ef<strong>for</strong>ts of both organizations with a central<br />
repository <strong>for</strong> the collection of in<strong>for</strong>mation relating to terrorist <strong>and</strong> criminal<br />
interference with civil aviation. This will offer the ability <strong>for</strong> the industry to<br />
<strong>Vol.1</strong>, <strong>No</strong>.2 2008 pp.95-114